andyjpb
Joined 16 years ago
Joined 16 years ago
...and it'd make screen mirroring during presentations a breeze!
This reply is a bit late because someone pointed me at it and suggested it was worth answering. ...so I hope that this is useful!
I have experience using Chicken Scheme in production both on knodium.com and registers.app
Both times it has gone well.
There's an HTTP implementation ( https://api.call-cc.org/5/doc/intarweb ), a webserver (https://api.call-cc.org/5/doc/spiffy that supports SSL) and an HTTP client ( https://api.call-cc.org/5/doc/http-client ). There's also an "app server" that tries to be like other app servers you might already know ( https://api.call-cc.org/5/doc/awful ).
We had to write a lot of our own stuff but it fits fairly neatly into the scheme-way of doing things: you can get a remarkable amount done with just a few simple lines of code.
I'd probably want to write about as much in any other language as a lot of what we built were domain level abstractions.
Knodium is now long gone but there's a video of what it looked like here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gOPuWi-dbQg
We had a very talented web designer and we also built a "Widgets and forms" toolkit. I gave a talk at FrOSCon quite early in the development and it was saved for posterity: https://media.ccc.de/v/c116_lisp_-_2013-08-25_11:15_-_buildi... The first few minutes of audio are broken but it sorts itself out.
I built a bunch of things along the way and released as many of them as I could as open source: http://wiki.call-cc.org/users/andyjpb
We're currently doing https://registers.app with a similar stack so I'd be pleased to talk more if anyone has any questions.
It's nice to have a dedicated and restricted resolver config so that the zone visibility can be restricted but that makes deployment a little more complex.
A cloud hack like the parent poster talks about assumes that you get access to the hypervisor layer and can look at the RAM of the guest machines.
This is not inconceivable. Rather, it seems quite reasonable given the complexity of hypervisors and the prevalence of CPU architecture bugs that makes these attacks easier.
Lots of these so-called "Cyber weapons" are operated by actors who are very effective at leaving no trace.
It's been in the background before but in the reports about this SolarWinds issue the "leaves no trace" angle is starting to be emphasised much more.
Not knowing if or what has been compromised means that the attacker can choose when or how to use the information they obtained and the victim will be surprised, even a long time down the line.
The other half is allowing the selection to come from a pool of desktops/workspaces common to all screens. i.e. the opposite of what i3 and Sway do.
So given desktops/workspaces a, b and c and screens 1 and 2, the following combinations are possible:
1: a; 2: b
1: a; 2: a
1: c; 2: a
...