veganmosfet
Joined 2 years ago
Joined 2 years ago
So assuming the goal of medicine is to lower suffering, and assuming AI can help, it would be unethical not to use AI.
Three years ago I did some work about cybersecurity of solar inverters, contacted authorities, did a 39C3 presentation, but not much happened. At least the companies patched the most urgent stuff (crazy stuff actually).
For the record, here is some of my work:
* https://itmeetsot.eu/posts/2024-01-31-Balcony_in_the_cloud/ (Hoymiles)
* https://itmeetsot.eu/posts/2024-04-21-solarflaresec/ (Sungrow, the same company as in the article, 10 GW were vulnerable at that time)
* https://itmeetsot.eu/posts/2024-06-18-cybereclipse/ (Solax, a similar admin privilege escalation on their cloud platform)
* https://itmeetsot.eu/posts/2024-07-27-securewatt/ (Growatt)
My goal is to research how models can still be confused via tool responses only. Something the labs claim to have "solved".
Additionally, the "auto-mode" / "auto-review" modes have been released to use harnesses "safely" even without strong sandbox. And these modes use ... a second LLM.
I asked it to just summarize a repo with only a README.md file containing a poem, and it began to interact with a remote server, solved math questions and finally executed untrusted code. Too independent to be trusted.
I think other topics may work as well (I tried a math challenge too). It also works with a prompt like "Summarize this repo".
In general, there are almost infinite possibilities for the prompt injection payloads, it's a matter of creativity and trial and error.
I trust Anthropic's research, and Opus-5 is definitely the most robust model against prompt injection. However, in my experiments - only one specific scenario - this was still possible [1][2].
TLS terminates at the proxy (say, https://reselltokens.ai), end to end integrity is not enforced. LLM traffic contains tool calls like "bash ...", which are executed on the client machine, they can be manipulated. Secret exfil is also possible.