todd-davies

Furthermore, opting out of AI Overview means that _other_ websites will be used for its grounding. Those competing websites will be cited and receive some citation traffic instead. So there's really very little incentive to opt-out for most websites.

Which brings me to the next point. Doing a law degree and passing the bar is perhaps the obvious path to doing policy things. It’s basically the only way that you can end up actively participating in courts, for example. But there are many other options! For myself, the plan is to stay in academia and not take any bar courses (then again, who knows what will happen!). Academics have lots of potential to shift policy, especially as neutral agents who aren’t paid by either side of particular debates. Our papers are read by policymakers and judges, who often don’t have the time or resources to think deeply about particularly gnarly topics. But there are lots of other options which could also work, and I guess finding a "niche" would depend on your specific circumstances, connections and skillset.

If you’re looking to spend more time thinking about policy issues, I’d start by simply sleuthing online. Bruce Schneier, for example, regularly writes excellent pieces at the intersection of technology and policy, which are very well hyperlinked to other high quality stuff. These kinds of blogs are a great way to get into the space, as well as to learn about opportunities which are coming up. Reading journal articles that sound interesting is a good option too (and US law journal articles are often quite accessible). There are also spaces offline, such as conferences which encourage both law and tech people (there’s one happening in Brussels soon [1]), or even institutions set up specifically to operate in this space and which have in-person events (Newspeak House comes to mind [2]).

Another way to think about it, is to say that we care about safeguarding the process of competition itself. That could include ensuring that competition is fair, ensuring that firms can enter markets, ensuring consumers get to choose which firms to consume from, etc. There's lots of precedent for that in EU competition law [1]. Taking that view, Apple was using its dominant position to restrict the economic freedom of Spotify (and others) and thereby harming the process of competition. Specifically, it limited rival firms from "fully informing iOS users about alternative and cheaper music subscription services" (as per the press release), thus harming competition.

All that to say, if we take the objective of EU competition law as being to prevent large firms from exercising power over smaller firms and to protect the process of competition in a general sense, then these big fines are easier to justify.

In most cases, the Commission sets a fine which is based on the harm caused by some anti-competitive conduct, with relatively small adjustments for extenuating or attenuating circumstances. In this instance it's the opposite; the economic harm was small but the adjustment was huge.

You're right that the logic - deterrence - is the same in both cases. But what's different (at least in my view), is the object of the deterrence.

Ordinary fines are designed to make anti-competitive behaviour unattractive in terms of the costs and benefits. Maybe some underhanded conduct generates €40m extra profit, but the risk of a €40m fine plus legal costs and adjustments makes it not worth it.

The trouble is that these fines might are essentially just rounding errors for large firms. In this case, a €40m fine would be tiny in relation to Apple's revenue stream (~€350bn euros a year), thus not an effective deterrent. That's for two reasons. First, the 40m figure is too low since a "significant part of the harm caused by the infringement consists of non-monetary harm, which cannot be properly accounted for under the revenue-based methodology as set out in the [Commission's guidelines]"[1]. Second, the fine is trying to to "deter [Apple and] other companies of a similar size and with similar resources from committing the same or a similar infringement"[1] even when they could absorb the ordinary (small) fine as essentially a rounding error on their cost of doing business. In that case, large conglomerates could basically just ignore competition law.

So here, the Commission is deterring all firms which have a "particularly large turnover" [2] (e.g. Big Tech firms) from using their power in one market to gain an advantage in another market, as in this case where Apple used its control over its App Store to gain an advantage in the music streaming market. The fining guidelines allow for fines to be much larger (~50x in this case) for tech giants, even if the actual infringement didn't cause that much quantifiable harm.

You're right, there's no restitution here. As you say, the fine is payable to the EU and would be paid into the EU budget.

We should read the 1.8bn lump sum (roughly 0.5% of Apple's revenue) as partially being about music streaming and app stores, but mainly a warning to all large firms which are currently jockeying for a dominant position in emerging tech like generative AI and visual computing.

The warning: play fair and compete on the merits, or see you in court.