tgma
Joined 15 years ago
Joined 15 years ago
- Most OLED PCs were not anywhere as bright as the old MBP miniLED display.
- Almost all OLED PCs have terrible blue shift when viewed at an angle.
- Apple miniLED XDR displays are no slouches either. They are not quite OLED, but they implemented the dimming zones very well with uniform backlighting and deep blacks.
I have not seen Apple's on MBP, but I bet it meets or exceeds iPad Pro Tandem OLED which does not have the two problems above.
So no, it is not the same as the decade old PC OLED. And I have ignored all the potential durability issues.
So you vote with your wallet for accessibility despite freedom and the rest of hacker news do the opposite and it all works itself out.
The major browsers are all US made though, so in the end there is an implicit trust on US vendors, even deeper than the trust on CA.
> It's also not at all a given that website owners would prefer the national CAs
The suggestion is to have a few major ones (LetsEncrypt) be able to sign everything like today but restrict the others. You can still choose to use the US one, just like you basically use CT logs from the US vendor today.
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In practice, DNSSEC/DANE based solution may be the practical path forward along this line.
That said, starting from the status quo, not sure that's the path of least resistance to get there.
Also the industry has changed a lot since Let's Encrypt. You could have argued against monopolizing the CA issuance to just a few countries/entities as sovereignty issue, and CAs were indeed exhibiting extreme rent-seeking behavior before Let's Encrypt. With a guaranteed free and accessible alternative in the mix, the weight of the arguments against would change.
Only a few major CAs in jurisdictions that admit heavy scrutiny and legal liability should operate. Country-specific CAs, if any, should only be scoped to signing certificates for their respective ccTLDs.
The way an American company, esp a reputable one like Google, conducts itself internally is different. There will be much more internal backlash to do the wrong thing way before litigation.
Sharing and phishing are on two different axes. You can have shareable credentials that are phishing-resistant when used.
You can have hardware-backed SSH keys that are not cloneable. You would need the browser to prevent phishing while still using SSH agent as its underlying signature mechanism (implied by my "in a consumer package").