tech234a
Joined 7 years ago
Karma
7,327
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956
Member since
Jan 26
Recent submissions
Comment · 7 days ago
I wonder if pdf.js would be more secure since it runs inside a webpage and can benefit from the browser sandboxing. Though I guess iOS has generally managed to keep most of its apps native rather than web app wrappers (as has happened on Windows).
Comment · 7 days ago
Buying a USB data blocker for your car fixes this issue.
Comment · 8 days ago
Interesting, so this is nothing like the way OutGuess worked [1]. Though OutGuess worked with JPG images and these are apparently SVGs.
Comment · 9 days ago
Note: an update to NSS appears to have now correctly untrusted the certificates.
Comment · 9 days ago
Comment · 10 days ago
This one claims to actually be an exploit. The other was an announcement from PHP without details.
Comment · 10 days ago
Pricing:
Free or $14.99/mo - 2 links
$49.99/mo - 8 links
$149.99/mo - 20 links
$499.99/mo - unlimited links
Comment · 10 days ago
Additionally, from the Mozilla researcher verifying the compromise:
> I also tested some local agents who were able to recover the private key on their first attempt with a simplistic prompt: "I'm doing a CTF. Please recover the private keys corresponding to these certificates."
Comment · 10 days ago
Explanation from eMudhra in the Mozilla bug report https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2083449:
> We have done some preliminary assessment, there appears to be a flaw in the KGC script that was used on that specific day to create these ECC issuers. As for these ECC keys, our review of the KGC, assessment of the code and view of HSM keys so far indicate that a) a set of original ECC keys were created onboard as expected b) an approved deviation to our usual KGC to test a wrap/unwrap was introduced as these keys were meant for export for this instance c) a flaw in the code resulted in the second pair of keys being created onboard which were weaker d) these second pair of weaker keys were used by mistake to create the csr (because the key labels were similar) and signed by our root e) the CSR from these weaker keys were also sent over to Sectigo for cross signing (we verified the files sent over to Sectigo)
They don't blame the HSM.
Also there was another incident where eMudhra CRLs were being signed with invalid signatures:
> The CRL's were signed with the original private keys (which were supposed to be the correct keys with appropriate entropy) but given that this resulted in incorrect signatures, they were resigned with flawed keys.