svantex
Joined 3 years ago
Joined 3 years ago
Just for fun, I tested now to build and publish for an ARM processor running Linux (linux-arm) and the build worked fine. I don't have a device to test it on though.
So... as long as it runs Linux and has an ARM or ARM64 processor and sufficient storage & memory it could work! (It's not tiny like a pure C-program unfortunately).
Would be cool to try...!
Why is it so hard for manufacturers to just go ahead and explain what really went wrong, without a lot of corporate b..t? Probably, if they do really say what happened in so many words they might open themselves for negligence lawsuits. Hopefully somebody files one anyway. The industry needs to learn to be better, and the only thing that talks loudly enough is probably money. Lost revenue, liability damages, and share holder value loss.
Whether or not "Rapid Response Content" and "Template Instances" are Turing complete is unclear, but the fact of the matter is that according to CrowdStrike "problematic content in Channel File 291 resulted in an out-of-bounds memory read triggering an exception", so the interpretation of the content is at least fairly complex. CrowdStrike also states that "Each Template Instance maps to specific behaviors for the sensor to observe, detect or prevent", and mentions a "Content Interpreter". Whether it's code or configuration data is not really relevant though, the point is that it's interpreted by a kernel mode driver which did not have sufficient validation of it's "Content" to prevent the crash.
But in a recent update of https://www.crowdstrike.com/falcon-content-update-remediatio... they have a long explanation of of things are supposed to work, with a lot of nice words (sounds almost AI-written...) and quite a few implications that it's really the customers fault who have not configured their systems to for example stay one version behind the latest and still a very short explanation of what went wrong.
But... Lo and behold, what are CrowdStrike going to do to avoid this happening in the future?
"Implement a staggered deployment strategy for Rapid Response Content in which updates are gradually deployed to larger portions of the sensor base, starting with a canary deployment." About time...
My main point, and the reason for the title, is that this has not been the major takeaway in main stream media analyses. Of course not "everyone" has missed this, but pretty much all media articles about the incident do appear to miss this.
That's not quite the same as saying "This is not related to Channel File 291 containing all nul bytes."...
I don't have first to hand knowledge here, but rely on Dave Plummer's statement.
Regardless of zeroes or single files or not, the fact is that bad data in C-00000291.sys in combination with bad validition in the driver causes it to crash. Deleting C-00000291.sys causes the driver to stop crashing.
Anyway, my main point isn't really about this. It's about the big bang global roll out simultaneously to at least 8.5 million systems in one go that's irresponsible.
The driver architecture is the lesser evil here, although it's bad enough!
What is definitely known is that a WHQL kernel mode driver from CrowdStrike crashes, and removing a single file external to the driver causes it to stop crashing. Some pretty sure conclusions can be drawn from that. No "probably" required.