spauka
Joined 15 years ago
Joined 15 years ago
I do wonder how similar the smell of sweet and bitter almonds are, they are apparently different [2].
[1] https://academic.oup.com/occmed/article-abstract/67/9/662/47... [2] https://www.thespruceeats.com/what-are-bitter-almonds-180699...
Given that this is the case, ntpd using 15% of the system memory means it was using about 13 MB of RAM - hardly a huge chunk by today's standards but not small either. I wonder if reducing the number of time servers would improve this much? On my system I can see I'm tracking about 9 servers from the debian pool.
Compare this to the XBox 360 which even at the time had 512 MB, it's really amazing how much they managed to squeeze out of such a tiny chip.
> So I put together a simple shell script that runs from the crontab every 15 min, outputting some system stats to a basic HTML file in the webroot.
The RP2350 security architecture involves several interconnected mechanisms which together provide authentication of code running on the chip, protected one-time-programmable storage, fine-grained control of debug features, and so on. An antifuse-based OTP memory serves as the root of trust of the system, and informs the configuration of ARM TrustZone as well as additional attack mitigations such as glitch detectors. Raspberry Pi even constructs an impressive, bespoke Redundancy Coprocessor (RCP), which hardens execution of boot ROM code on the Cortex-M33 cores with stack protection, data validation, and instruction latency randomization.
Since there are many potential incorrect guesses to be made about where problems might lie, here I begin with the most fundamental features of the chip logic, including the reset process. Even small oversights at this level can entirely defeat sophisticated security efforts if higher-level mechanisms place complete trust in seemingly simple hardware operations. I show how cursory research into the design details of IP blocks used in the SoC can help inform an attack, and demonstrate the importance of fully testing new features which are built atop older IP. Ultimately, the significant amount of luck (or lack thereof) involved is a reminder of the need to meticulously understand and validate complex systems.
Encryption is mandated for data at rest and data in transit. There is a provision for encryption of data in use when homomorphic encryption becomes feasible, but the loophole referenced in the title is that it is not required now.
In fact I think that's a great example of exactly what is actually discussed, namely that the context that ChatGPT is able to hold is limited as it's context is held completely in its input. There is never any modification to it's internal state, we're just passing a longer input vector in to the start of the GPT-3 black box. For long inputs the embedding vector becomes more and more sparse and it needs to make more assumptions to fill in it's output.
Conductive transparent materials do exist (see ITO https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indium_tin_oxide), but this is not it.
See P5-6 in section "The implausibility problem" - which points out that in order for the treatment to be effective it had to be refined into a form that is not rapidly eliminated from the body.