spaintech
Joined 6 years ago
Joined 6 years ago
Current ISAs have so much machinery underneath that it’s hard to tell when you’re talking to the iron and when you’re talking to the microcode
You can still argue that Forth on a Forth CPU is a genuinely low-level language. :)
For frontier labs, their fund-train-new model play might not be as effective, and a shift of spent of compute cost moving away from training to inference might be a tell-tell sign of the LLM as we know it plateauing out as scale is just not as effective. Open models might also be placing a major pressure on meeting then revenue targets need to sustain the model, lots of customer hosting their own inference to mitigate costs.
If you only move the needle just slightly in the direction of inference, frontier labs will soon loose their alphas. Becoming just another SaaS for inference might not be as attractive unless you are Google/MSF ( IMHO ).
Should this pan out, it could be a scenario where the NeoClouds could soon loose their biggest customers, so I tend to agree with that aspect of Zitron’s view.
Thoughts?
Tethered Forth programming on small devices is an underrated opportunity, IMO. There is also the opportunity to revise the OpenBoot project, I remember the days of automation for deployments at the Bios, it was an amazing tool for massive deployments of Sun T systems in telcos.
Is it feasible to exploit these undocumented HCI commands to develop malicious firmware for the ESP32? Such firmware could potentially be designed to respond to over-the-air (OTA) signals, activating these hidden commands to perform unauthorized actions like memory manipulation or device impersonation.
However, considering that deploying malicious firmware already implies a significant level of system compromise, how does this scenario differ from traditional malware attacks targeting x86 architectures to gain low-level access to servers?
In other words, language models are advanced pattern recognizers that mimic logical reasoning without genuinely understanding the underlying logic.
We might need to shift our focus on the training phase for better performance?
For some critical software we developed, we used TLA+ for high-level formal specification. As mentioned earlier, transitioning the actual implementation to another language can be challenging, especially if partial hardware bootstrapping is required. We ended up implementing the high-level specification created in TLA+ using ADA/Spark, which minimized our exposure to buffer and assertion failures. However, optimizing the code to meet performance thresholds was at times frustrating and time-consuming, like any low-level implementation with a new tool/language for us.
I’m curious about any new tools or workflows for leveraging TLA+ high-level specification implementation into other languages like C and Rust. What approaches are people taking once the formalized specification is verified in TLA+ to complete the implementation?
I might be out of the loop, but using TLA+ spec and translate then to other languages hasn’t been a successful use case for LLMs. While they can be helpful, a significant effort is still required to ensure that implementations accurately adhere to the specifications.