skuenzli
Joined 18 years ago
Joined 18 years ago
Then Claude uses the MCP tools according to the SKILL definition: https://github.com/mutable-state-inc/ensue-skill/blob/main/s...
I'll reach out to the email address in your profile.
I have a friend searching for such a firm now and of the ~15 firms contacted none had any experience with health care immigration.
They have decades of experience with IT services and the path to H1-B for IT.
If no suggestions, can you share thoughts on why healthcare immigration attorney help seems to be difficult to find?
I'm not up on EKS-ELB these days, but if the nodes only allow ingress to NodePorts from the ELB, then it seems like those findings should be suppressed in most orgs.
If the SecEng team was partnering with the delivery team they'd know that before sending the report.
Agree that leaders should definitely be ready to motivate stakeholders and collaborating teams to act on this kind of info before spending significant time gathering & producing it.
i.e. was the VP trying to reduce risk? scale out responsibility for managing access?
Really feels like security can actually be "everyone's job" when you're able to make good access management decisions from within your existing tools and their supporting context.
re Problem Awareness
I agree being aware that your security policy doesn't do what you think it does is definitely a problem. We're working on that too with reports of your actual, effective access and educational materials.
Let's illustrate this problem with an example. Many people don't realize the problems around using IAM policies with wildcard resource conditions. This results in incidents like a role for a firewall application having access to unrelated data for a credit application.
A principal (IAM user or role) with an IAM security policy that allows calling an api action like `s3:GetObject` to all resources means that principal can access objects inside any bucket within the AWS account by default.
This DenyEveryoneElse statement: https://github.com/k9securityio/tf_s3_bucket/blob/master/exa...
prevents access by unauthorized principals at the bucket level.
re Migration
There are at least two ways to migrate to this module:
First, if you are already using Terraform and want to try out a better bucket policy, you can use the policy submodule directly. This is described in the README and demonstrated in the tests: https://github.com/k9securityio/tf_s3_bucket/blob/master/tes...
Second, if you want to migrate an existing bucket into this Terraform module, you can use `terraform import` or `terraform mv` to migrate the AWS bucket resource into a new Terraform module definition.
I'd be happy to speak with you and anyone else about AWS security problems. Contact info in profile.
Thanks for taking a look at our Terraform module designed to help Cloud teams protect data in AWS S3, quickly and confidently. Feedback appreciated :)
We are trying to improve the usability of Cloud security.
Specifically, we've heard that the AWS security model is too complex and difficult to validate.
Configuring a least privilege bucket policy is amongst the most difficult AWS security challenges and a problem we're trying to solve for non-security experts.
Do you feel like this module makes it easy to understand what access the author intends to grant? What makes that difficult?
Thanks!
Stephen
Risk management in tech/cybersecurity is really immature compared to other domains like structural engineering (earthquakes), finance (portfolio risk position), or environmental health and safety.
riskquant and similar tools do the critical work of making proven risk analysis methods accessible in delivery pipelines and deployment platforms for inclusion in continuous risk monitoring systems and scaling periodic risk analysis activities.
[email protected]
[ my public key: https://keybase.io/skuenzli; my proof: https://keybase.io/skuenzli/sigs/4aT1jCHgwQf6iKBFS25ZvHTOkMgIXUKgUWF8ijl3lXM ]