rfoo

it's almost certainly rounding up 2.8T

lol don't shout out the obvious

Let's face it. Chinese labs made some of the biggest advancements. AND training on Claude (or GPT) output IS unreasonably effective. The two sentences are true at the same time.

The issue here is there is NO single system API for looking up user account entries on Linux.

It's implemented in libc. So you need to link to libc. Tailscale is a Go binary, and they probably prefer it to be statically-linked. glibc NSS implementation also REQUIRES you to load `.so` so you just can't emulate it in Go.

Then, "link to libc". Which libc? glibc? musl?

Assuming CRIU can checkpoint and restore Chrome, and especially recent versions of Chrome, just fine, is a little bit of stretch.

z.ai posted an announcement earlier that day (in GMT+8) saying that they will make GLM-5.2 available later today at 5:21pm so it can't be a coincidence.

Good troll.

> Different company

Same people.

At this scale thinking tokens don't matter anymore.

In Feb Anthropic called out three Chinese labs for "distillation attacks", but a lab missing in their post actually had most Claude generated tokens among all Chinese labs in their midtrain data :p

Glad to hear that as I have some fun challenge ideas that would be otherwise too tedious to solve.

Easier checkpoint & restore.

Another case: People who want to run workloads that are inherently incompatible with Kubernetes networking model.

For example:

* For some cursed reasons you want to make sure every single one instance of a large batch job see just one NIC in its container and they are all the same IP and you NAT to the outside world. Ingress? What ingress? This is a batch job!

* Like the previous point, except that your "batch job" somehow has multiple containers in one instance now, and they should be able to reach each other by domain.

The problem here is both aimed for Day 0 support, both got embargoed preliminary model weights and arch, and I don't think they have access to the other sides embargoed code.

> I read about 30% and got bored.

I was lucky then :) Somehow I saw this first. And then the "somewhat reliably writing exploits for SpiderMonkey" part, and then the crypto libraries part. Finally I wonder why is there a Linux LPE mini writeup and realized it's the "automatically turn a syzkaller report to a working exploit" part.

Now that I read the first few things (meh bugs in OpenBSD, FFmpeg, FreeBSD etc) they are indeed all pretty boring!

> Mythos Preview identified a memory-corruption vulnerability in a production memory-safe VMM. This vulnerability has not been patched, so we neither name the project nor discuss details of the exploit.

Good morning Sir.

> Has anything changed here? I don't pay much attention but KASLR was considered basically useless for preventing LPE a few years ago.

No. It's still like this. Bonus point that there are always free KASLR leaks (prefetch side-channels).

But then, this thing is just.. I don't have a word for this. Just randomly read paragraphs from the post and it's like, what?