rasengan

Cryptocurrencies give sovereignty over your own money... and all the bells and whistles that come with sovereignty: You're responsible for keeping your own funds, and life, safe.

They used to say Yellow 5 was really bad for males... and it used to specifically say "Yellow 5" in the ingredients. First time I heard it called "Tartrazine!"

Depends what interest, contingencies and on other information to understand if 1.2B debt is a problem or not. Otherwise, for most UHNW people, debt is just a number on a balance sheet.

I feel really bad for you.

It might actually be wise [1] to create a new, slightly less permissioned license for open source wherein the open is defined as anything that isn’t in a kill or surveillance chain or, more broadly, for military use…

[1] for the community

> Orr Dunkelman

The great Dr. Orr Dunkelman was admirably vocal in his opposition to the publishing of this draft.

RFCs are used by developers as strict guidelines for implementation.

The mere publishing of an RFC has customarily been treated by developers as a stamp of approval from the IETF.

The NSA, contractors and their fans argue that simply adding a "RECOMMENDED=N" in an obscure section of this draft will somehow prevent said implementations in deployments.

However, as an example, Canada's NSA equivalent specifically requested the draft to be published so that they can use it to support their poor choice in deployment of solo ML-KEM nation-wide.

While ML-KEM may be sound, significant bugs in implementations in the wild continue to be published.

To be clear, CRQCs do not exist today.

ECC is battle tested, proven, and is used today.

It makes no sense to delete working cryptography and replace it with potentially buggy, non-battle tested implementations of new cryptography for a threat that does not yet exist today.

Instead, you fight HNDL [1] with hybrid which preserves the safety of today, and hopefully also, tomorrow.

No serious security person should be recommending otherwise which is, perhaps, why some may question the motives of those that are pushing for solo ML-KEM.

[1] Harvest now decrypt later

> A majority (but not a large majority) of cryptography engineers would use hybrids at this point

Actually, based on the WGLC, or the three of them rather, it's pretty clear that Ph.D cryptographers significantly prefer hybrid over pure ML-KEM.

> he'd much rather you believe he's arguing for hybrids against people who are trying to exterminate hybrids.

The brigade by the NSA (6+ votes or more if you include NSA contractors), the AD being former NSA and the moderation of Dr. Bernstein for a footnote seems pretty fair and balanced </sic>.

Meanwhile, the lead of the EU PQC program, professors from several universities, Ph.Ds and, additionally, legendary cryptographers all expressed significant concern and even stronger opposition to the publishing of the draft.

Finally, the chairs refused to share their methodology in determining consensus when asked by several Professors and Ph.Ds.

I certainly find it fascinating that the majority of those in favor come from signal intelligence agencies, while the majority of those against are PhD cryptographers.

I was happy to see the lead of Europe’s PQC team also voted with the cryptographers.

It’s been like this for a while. Take a technology, call it a weapon and control it. Same playbook.

To be fair, whenever I join a pre-existing code-base [1], it's the same. I have no idea and have to map it out ;)

[1] Not AI codebases (and of course, AI code bases I guess)