prolyxis

I suppose the problem in multiplayer is that everyone has the same wall clock time, so you couldn't easily have consistent time dilation and related effects such as the twin paradox.

Except that as far as I understand, one of the inspirations for the Turing machine is to explain precisely the computations a human computer could perform with (potentially a lot of) pen and paper.

Note that the $15.99 is for the 64 GB version. The 1 TB version sells for above $100.

Or a person could have the program either critique their flashcards as they write them, or suggest new sorts of flashcards to create without doing the work for them by automatically generating them.

The human brain, the authors argue, in fact uses multiple networks when interpreting and producing language. These include:

- the language network, which delivers formal linguistic competence - the multiple demand network, which provides reasoning ability - the default network, which tracks narratives above the clause level - the theory of mind network, which infers the mental state of another entity

This leads to their argument that a modular structure would lead to enhanced ability for an LLM to be both formally and functionally competent. (While LLMs currently exhibit human-level formal linguistic competence, their functional competence--the ability to navigate the real world through language--has room for improvement.)

Transformer models, they note, have degree of emergent modularity through "allowing different attention heads to attend to different input features."

I was wondering, is it possible to characterize the degree of emergent modularity in current systems?

Yes. This was a big part of the GPT-4o demos. But likely they've specifically fine-tune it not to show negative emotions in a serious fashion.

I don't think neural correlates of consciousness have been identified, so clearly there remains research to be done. I'm not in touch with the neuroscience literature, but acknowledging the hard problem of consciousness means one should accept there is a lot of work remaining. That being said, I believe the hard problem is surmountable. In my mind the situation is similar to computer science before Turing's description of the Turing machine: there were imprecise notions abound about what computation meant that needed to be clarified through a concrete model. My view is simply that finer control over conscious experience would aid understanding enormously. But you're right, I should probably skim the real research more.

I am hopeful that advances in brain-computer interfaces will start to provide a partial answer to the question of "what's there" and why it's there. It seems to me the ability to controllably augment one's own consciousness with precision will tremendously clarify the necessary ingredients for consciousness.

This mostly just left me with a greater appreciation for the seamlessness of the original rabbit-duck illusion.