pcaharrier

Short answer: No, it's not.

Apparently, however, the question would never have even been asked but for the fact that the prosecution was trying to get a conviction under the state's felony murder statute and needed it to be a felony robbery.

Butterick's point seems right on to me. Instead of running around, hair on fire, screaming that "something must be done!" it makes much more sense right now to simply start by enforcing laws that are already on the books.

The ruling is strictly limited to whether a private citizen can sue the federal government for money damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). It does not legalize the intentional withholding, theft, or destruction of mail, all of which remain federal crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 1703 and § 1709 and are subject to investigation and prosecution by the Postal Inspection Service. Additionally, the decision does not apply to constitutional challenges, which fall under different legal frameworks and can still be addressed through court injunctions or civil rights litigation (i.e., the right to vote or equal protection). Essentially, the Court held that the government is immune from being sued for cash in these specific civil instances, but it did not grant postal workers immunity from criminal law or constitutional oversight.

I actually think the law isn't terrible (at least not as far as state stalking laws go), but the argument that his lawyer (or the petitioner himself; it's not clear whether he was represented) strikes me as a little odd.

The stalking statute defines “Unconsented contact” as "any contact with another individual that is initiated or continued without that individual’s consent or in disregard of that individual’s expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued." It then goes on to list seven things that constitute unconsented contact, with the caveat that the definition includes "but is not limited to, any of" those seven things. A little further down in the opinion the court explains "Petitioner contends that the light stemming from respondents’ flood lights constitutes unconsented contact under MCL 750.411h(1)(f)(vii)."

Perhaps the statute could use a little tightening, but it seems to me that hanging your hat on "light is an object" is a silly argument, when you could just as easily have argued that shining the lights is contact of the kind that isn't expressly included in the non-exhaustive list. If true, one might be able to show that it was done on purpose and with knowledge that it would annoy. That should be enough to constitute unconsented contact, especially when you compare it to the other kinds of things the statute lists (e.g., "Sending mail or electronic communications to that individual" with no requirement that they be opened or read).

It's also worth noting that the court didn't overrule the trial court on the other arguments the petitioner made because "there was no persuasive evidence showing that respondents were responsible for these incidents" and "given [the] lack of detail, the trial court did not clearly err." Moral of the story: if you think your neighbor is harassing you, make a note of dates and times.

"a crank who got a new neighbours who live differently than he does, and he doesn’t like it."

Many such cases, if my previous work experience in the criminal justice system is any indication.

Bottom line: light can be a common law nuisance, but it doesn't (without more) constitute stalking.

Yes, but only if the judge who gets the case believes in silly things like "Federal Rules of Evidence."