paravirtualized
Joined 3 years ago
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Comment · 2 years ago
Comment · 2 years ago
The woes of supporting an "I don't want to leave any crumbs" threat model. There are countless of pro-privacy projects who call themselves that simply because their service can be used to increase privacy, but they do not actually do much to protect privacy beyond that. Many even use Google Analytics.
For B, simply support both. This site is popular enough for there to be no risk sharing: Guerrilla Mail.
Comment · 2 years ago
> Made this privacy conscious temporary mail extension
> Enable JavaScript and cookies to continue
It's not privacy conscious. Privacy conscious would mean A) does not use Cloudflare as a CDN B) does not require JavaScript C) does not discriminate against Tor users.
There are a few services like this already, which I'm not going to spoil for cred on HN, but my rating of this site as of now is 0/10, unusable in the literal sense.
Comment · 2 years ago
PSA: It's Tor not TOR.
Comment · 2 years ago
Comment · 2 years ago
> How is booting your encrypted partition in a VM within Tails more secure than booting it directly?
There will be no proof of an operating system existing at all, just random data. If you use VeraCrypt along with a hidden partition normally, you would still have the VeraCrypt bootloader or an apparent Windows installation on the drive.
Comment · 2 years ago
I think that the focus of combining it with Whonix is interesting and is what piqued my interest originally. Other than that, nothing.
Comment · 2 years ago
See also: https://github.com/IncognitoIceman/HiddenVM
Unfortunately, it looks like this version is no longer maintained.
"HiddenVM is a futuristic tool powered by KVM designed to combine the powerful amnesic nature of Tails and the impenetrable design of Whonix with the unbreakable strength of Veracrypt."
Comment · 2 years ago
It's highly unlikely that any operating system can be as secure as Qubes OS[1], simply by considering the model itself. Especially if using Whonix[2] VMs to browse the internet. It is based on GNU/Linux and Xen.
Each piece of software can be separated into its own VM. It uses read only templates for the root filesystem, making it difficult for malware to persist.
Templates have no access to networking or hardware making it difficult for them to be compromised, AppVMs where you run software can be treated as throwaway and be trivially destroyed after each use.
Dom0 has no access to networking, USB devices and runs no software. Total compromise would require a hypervisor escape.
It is designed with the assumption that you will be owned start to finish.
Here is a good talk by Roger Dingledine, the original author of tor dispelling common myths and giving some statistics on its real world usage: https://inv.nadeko.net/watch?v=Di7qAVidy1Y
And for good measure,
It's Tor not TOR: https://support.torproject.org/#about_why-is-it-called-tor