Recent submissions

Comment · 11 days ago
in this Israeli election, an individual voter likely has an O(1-in-a-million) chance of swinging the election one way or the other (ie the chance that their vote brings their party another seat, which ends up being pivotal to the coalition; source: chatgpt simulation)

it's not hard to come up with an aggregate social welfare valuation of many billions of dollars for this election, especially considering the effects on non-Israelis also

So here the case for voting, at a cost of thousands of dollars, is rather straightforwardly rational, assuming only that one is somewhat unselfish; and possibly even if one is selfish the individual stakes could be equivalent to thousands of dollars

Comment · 6 months ago
You're right, I either misread your comment or got confused with a different comment or something.

But I do think the Mitsui point is relevant; in particular, the claim that the citation is supposed to back up is:

"Moreover, even assuming that Heppner intended to share these communications with his counsel and eventually did so, it is black-letter law that non-privileged communications are not somehow alchemically changed into privileged ones upon being shared with counsel."

But the distinction Mitsui is actually making is rather different: between communications "for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice" and not; that's at best orthogonal to Rakoff's claim; and the other two cases I mentioned pretty explicitly make the opposite case: documents written with intent to share with counsel, and then actually shared with counsel seeking legal advice, are in fact covered under privilege. The assumption being that the documents are not "pre-existing", they're created as part of the process of communicating with counsel.

But yes, I agree that the "third-party" point separately undermines privilege in many contexts.

Comment · 6 months ago
no, Heppner's attorney-client privilege argument wasn't that the conversation was privileged inherently because it was legal consultation with Claude, but that it was privileged as personal notes made in preparation for consultation with counsel and then actually communicated to counsel, see Ford-Bey v. Professional Anesthesia Services and Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Viad Corp.

Rakoff makes two arguments against this:

- privilege was broken because Claude/Anthropic is a third party; but I don't think he successfully distinguishes Claude from say Google Docs/Translate/Gmail in this regard (he just notes that Google Docs isn't usually claimed to confer privilege on its own; but this is not the claim being made about Claude either); and see NYSBA ethics rules 820 and 842)

- he quotes Gould v Mitsui: documents do not "acquire protection merely because they were transferred" to counsel; but that same case says they do acquire protection if communicated "for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice"

Comment · 6 months ago
The ruling explicitly overrules Shih, thus making exactly that argument:

> Shih, of course, is not binding on this Court, and this Court respectfully disagrees with its holding. As relevant here, the court in Shih principally concluded that the work product doctrine is not limited to materials prepared by or at the direction of an attorney. Id. But that conclusion undermines the policy animating the work product doctrine, which, as one of the cases cited in Shih explains, is "to preserve a zone of privacy in which a lawyer can prepare and develop legal theories and strategy 'with an eye toward litigation.'"

Comment · 6 months ago
The overruling of both Shih and the standards laid out in NYSBA ethics opinions 820/842 (and various other state bar associations, and the fact that apparently no one tried to challenge those in court until AI) without real discussion of implications seems rather unusual; and that's a rather charitable reading to avoid the crazier "Claude is a person" framing

also, he quotes Gould v Mitsui: documents do not "acquire protection merely because they were transferred" to counsel; but that same case says they do acquire protection if communicated "for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice"

Comment · 7 months ago
I don't know much about the Kingdom of Jerusalem per se, but even today many Jews say prayers specifically written after the Crusades https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhineland_massacres So the symbols of "hope and triumph of establishing Christianity in the Holy Land" do not evoke particularly positive connotations, even aside from the usual modern opposition to that particular mission.
Comment · 8 months ago
Ah, sorry. I have a (bad?) habit of using newlines as sentence separator in informal contexts, and HN likes to eat newlines if they're not doubled. I'd edit but it's too late now.
Comment · 8 months ago
eh this "plagiarism" framing is overreaching there were two proofs in the paper: countability of algebraic numbers and uncountability of reals countability of algebraic numbers is a rather trivial induction on countability of rationals/pairs of numbers, which Cantor already knew about Cantor himself did prove uncountability of real numbers; Dedekind just helped him clean the proof up to me it seems like Dedekind's assistance was the kind of thing that might merit an acknowledgement, or possibly even joint authorship if subspecialty norms are generous, but far from a novel contribution on its own; unlike the uncountability of reals which was genuinely important and nontrivial. Dedekind, like Cantor, had other very important contributions, but certainly no claim on what Cantor is known for; and the context with Kronecker meant that this would prevent the work from ever being published. Also, this article doesn't actually show Dedekind was specifically upset by the "plagiarism", there may be any number of other reasons they may have stopped corresponding; and Dedekind's "hope this is useful" comment to Cantor can be read as permission to use it for his purposes
Comment · 1 year ago
I think there are much better argument for mandatory jury duty, like the fact that it's an inherent and explicit part of the preexisting Constitution, and that was not explicitly repealed nor (as far as I know) considered.

But the Court chose not to use those arguments, perhaps because they are less absolute and don't apply as cleanly to the draft.

Personally, I think that jury duty as it is today (no real pay, sometimes very long trials, "hardship" completely at the discretion of the judge) is actually a substantive violation of the principles of liberty that the 13th Amendment (along with the rest of the Constitution, notably the 5th Amendment) was meant to protect; (though I myself would likely enjoy actually being on a jury, and am fortunate that I can afford it/my work would likely pay).

And I don't think it would've been crazy to require an Amendment to institute a compulsory military draft, or better yet interpret the 13th Amendment to allow the draft (and jury duty) on narrower grounds but use it to better protect soldiers against various abuses inherent in the current military power structure and lack of exit option.

I do think that mandatory road duty is about as direct a violation of the purpose of the 13th Amendment as anything else the state could do. I think the (explicit) argument that the takings and due process clauses protect your money but not your labor is patently ridiculous.

Comment · 1 year ago
Yeah, I'm saying the Supreme Court is obviously wrong to allow it on the grounds that they do
Comment · 1 year ago
Comment · 1 year ago
> integers exist

Mostly as an abstraction on top of a continuous wavefunction/quantum field

> Spacetime ends up being discretizable

As far as I know this is speculative and usually assumed by physicists to be false; it's definitely not a required feature of quantum mechanics per se, and as far as I know not of any other well-accepted theory.

Comment · 1 year ago
Note that in general, a physical instantiation of an undecidable problem must be specified/realized to _infinite_ precision; that is, for any such system S, and for any eps>0, there is a perturbation p with distance d<eps (eg, move a billiard ball an arbitrarily small amount) that is provable; this is analogous to the fact that existence of solutions to Diophantine equations is undecidable, but the theory of real closed fields is decidable, which means that the only undecidable case is when an equation has solutions _arbitrarily close_ to integers, but never quite an integer. I am not a physicist, but I don't believe any physics actually cares about infinitely-precise setups.
Comment · 1 year ago
For what it's worth, while I find this "obvious" as well, given the Church-Turing Thesis etc, Nobel Prize-winning physicist and philosopher Roger Penrose famously does think that human brains require access to non-computable insights to do math.

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