Recent submissions

Comment · 1 year ago
Safari actually implements Site Isolation. Process-per-tab isolation was introduced in Safari 15 in 2021, and site isolation features were further enhanced in Safari 16.4.
Comment · 1 year ago
QubesOS lacks Secure Boot implementation and has insufficient boot chain protection. Its security heavily relies on OS isolation through the Xen hypervisor, though it remains vulnerable to attacks on the hypervisor itself. Furthermore, the operating systems running inside maintain the same characteristics as typical Linux distributions (incomplete exploit mitigation features, weak kernel protection mechanisms, insufficient system call and memory protection), and the security within containers remains limited (unless running an OS with macOS-level security, the internal OS security remains inadequate).

Regarding the elevator pitches provided, QubesOS emphasizes "hardware isolation" and makes claims such as being "better than physical air-gap," though in practice it operates at the virtualization level. The system's fundamental security considerations could benefit from more detailed explanation. The suggestion to store passwords in plain text (even in cases of Xen escape, offline status wouldn't provide protection, and storing in plain text presents risks) might lead to misconceptions about security. While the endorsement by Edward Snowden is noted, it would be helpful to focus more on the technical aspects and implementation details.

Comment · 1 year ago
I agree. I haven't seen any Linux OS with proper security featuring dm-verity-based Secure Boot (except for documentation in Arch explaining how to implement it).

Most distributions cannot be considered security-hardened by default.

What do you think is causing this situation?

Comment · 1 year ago
Fedora Silverblue's Secure Boot is also primarily for UEFI support and not fundamentally designed to create a boot chain or detect attacks on the OS. Additionally, it has weaknesses in kernel protection mechanisms (insufficient kernel module loading restrictions), inadequate system call protection, and incomplete memory protection mechanisms. While its immutable design is notable, the detection and defense mechanisms against base system attacks are inadequate, with limited security verification of the rpm-ostree system itself.

Linux distributions' exploit mitigation features include basic ASLR, DEP, and RELRO, but their implementations are incomplete. Advanced protection features like those found in macOS (such as PAC, Pointer Authentication, strict stack protection, and JIT spray attack prevention) are either not implemented by default or are limited in scope.

Resolving these issues would require an enormous investment of time and cost to apply parameters and patches, and these solutions are not available by default.

While QubesOS's approach is interesting, it lacks Secure Boot, and its security relies on sandboxing through OS isolation via the Xen hypervisor, while the operating systems within still contain the aforementioned issues (though running a macOS-level secure OS in QubesOS might be a solution).

Comment · 1 year ago
While Linux systems like ChromeOS and Android could be considered sufficiently hardened, mainstream distributions generally don't prioritize security, with developers simply creating what they prefer. They lack comprehensive security features like those found in macOS (e.g., SIP, XProtect, MRT, Gatekeeper and other multi-layered protection mechanisms).

Secure Boot on most Linux distributions, except for a few that implement TPM-based Secure Boot like ChromeOS Flex and custom Linux builds, is merely intended for UEFI support and Windows dual-boot compatibility, rather than being a genuine mechanism for detecting OS image tampering.

Comment · 2 years ago
Sorry, I meant greater than 5.
Comment · 2 years ago
I'm simply curious and would like to play with it if it's there :)
Comment · 2 years ago
Why would be UNIX-like? Is it meant to be a UNIX architecture?
Comment · 2 years ago
Is full application/process separation due to virtualization or sandboxing? Or by a validated kernel hypervisor? Or something like Unikernel?
Comment · 2 years ago
Why?
Comment · 2 years ago
Xen
Comment · 2 years ago
It's very helpful! Thanks! But is this a single unikernel? Or is it a management of them?

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