nextgens

The original freenet design was replicating content as it was requested. You had no way of locating "all" the copies as they would get cached "along the way" elsewhere on the keyspace when you request them.

That property was useful both for improving availability AND censorship resistance: you could not attempt to "locate" where the blocks are without spreading them.

My naive understanding of the new design is that you can have contracts that are replicated... but they still cluster around the same place in the keyspace so any capable active adversary can actively deny access to content trivially. Did I misunderstand something here?

Thank you for the downvotes.

You're moving the debate here. The question was "How are the goals different?" from the project leader (who ought to know better), not whether moving them makes sense.

Meshcore's crypto is interesting.

ECB, issues with key generation, key negotiation, seldom authenticated data, ...

It definitely works better than MT but please stop lauding it for its cryptographic properties ;)

It's at the bottom of their TODO, under the heading "V2 protocol spec".

TLS1.0 introduced modularity via the concept of "extensions". It's everything but a minor evolution of the protocol.

One of the many things it brought is session tickets, enabling server-side session resumption without requiring servers to keep synced-up state. Another is Server Name Indication, enabling servers to use more than one certificate.

TLS1.0 introduced modularity via the concept of "extensions". It's everything but a minor evolution of the protocol.

As one of the maintainers of Mailu, I'd say use Mailu!

Why? three main reasons: (a) security (as you have identified isolation matters, but that is not the only thing), (b) get the benefits of "battle-tested" setups and (c) features

On security: in its default config, Mailu scans emails for malicious macros via oletools (and optionally viruses via clamav). It also uses a hardened-malloc, Snuffleupagus (a security module for PHP), gates all PHP code behind an authentication wall (webmails), ... and does both DANE and MTA-STS validation to ensure your emails are delivered to the right place. The authentication stack handles "smart" rate-limiting: you get to limit the number of authentications with distinct credentials over a time-period (a misconfigured thick client won't trigger it), you have plenty of ways to avoid running into it (application tokens for thick clients, per-device cookies that give you a way out, whitelisting of "used" addresses, ...) and you also get to rate limit the number of sent emails (useful if a spammer gets their hands on the credentials of one of your users)

On the importance of "battle-testing" setups: well, there are plenty of non-subtle ways of breaking an email setup. Experience has shown that all the layers in the stack can be problematic... I can give you a bunch of examples of what we ran into recently if you want.

On features: your setup might be simpler but your users are missing out. Whether it's enhanced filtering (like with oletools), better indexing (full text search), indexing of attachments (with OCR! via Apache Tika), configuring server-side rules with managesieve or just "having an interface" to configure ooo, change their passwords, configure aliases or delegate permissions.

I have started spending time on Mailu because I don't like the bloat that comes with Mailcow. Give Mailu a shot; it is reasonably easy to debug when things go wrong (and not written in PHP :p).

No, and it doesn't protect the privacy of the viewer either!

Mailu - a mail server as a set of Docker images.

Sure you can defeat it using specialized tools... but at that point, you are far from "all I need is a pen" and opportunistic attacks. The tool will have to match the width of the zipper: you'll need a collection or to have done reconnaissance.

At that point, shimming the zip-tie itself is probably easier/faster (and doable without specialized tools).