martinralbrecht

Joined 12 years ago

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308
Submissions
44
Member since
Apr 27
I am a professor in the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London. I work on cryptography and computational mathematics.
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Recent submissions

Comment · 9 months ago
Comment · 9 months ago
Comment · 9 months ago
WhatsApp's end-to-end encryption has been independently investigated: https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/ws/files/324396471/whatsapp.pdf

Full version here: https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/794.pdf

We didn't review the entire source code, only the cryptographic core. That said, the main issue we found was that the WhatsApp servers ultimately decide who is and isn't in a particular chat. Dan Goodin wrote about it here: https://arstechnica.com/security/2025/05/whatsapp-provides-n...

Comment · 2 years ago
Comment · 2 years ago
We explain this under the heading "A Somewhat Opinionated Discussion" here: https://mtpsym.github.io/ which is our security analysis of MTProto's symmetric cryptography.
Comment · 3 years ago
Comment · 3 years ago
Comment · 3 years ago
"As independent information security and cryptography researchers, we build technologies that keep people safe online. It is in this capacity that we see the need to stress that the safety provided by these essential technologies is now under threat in the Online Safety Bill."
Comment · 3 years ago
- Issue 1: using uninitialised keys. - Issue 2: IV reuse in AES-GCM when a file is re-encrypted after an update. - Issue 3: a malicious server can place a chosen key in a victim user's encrypted keystore; the user then rotates everything to that key on next login/update.
Comment · 3 years ago
Cool, thanks! That's interesting to know. Do you know how they deal with FOI and auditable communications in this case?

PS: I talked about the seemingly unexploitable IND-CCA vulnerability because it means Matrix can't give you some security guarantees: It should be fine - we don't have an exploit, only a vulnerability - but it is not clear how to reason to arrive at "there cannot be an exploit". If you care about security guarantees, you care about it.

Comment · 3 years ago
Since Matrix (and thus BundesMessenger?) currently doesn't provide standard security guarantees for its end-to-end encryption (the mitigation to the "Simple confidentiality break" from https://nebuchadnezzar-megolm.github.io/ is still in the design phase; same for the IND-CCA break, but that doesn't seem exploitable in practice) I wonder how much the German government cares about E2EE for its civil servants? The blog post mentions E2EE prominently, but any insights to share on whether that mattered for this particular adoption?
Comment · 3 years ago
re: implementation bugs: Almost, but not quite. See https://nebuchadnezzar-megolm.github.io/#anticipated-questio...

Also note that in the review of the ecosystem the Matrix developers, i.e you :), also discovered further clients vulnerable to variants of attack #3 and assigned CVE-2022-39252, CVE-2022-39254 and CVE-2022-39264.

While I'm here, yep those seem fixed also as far as we can tell: https://nebuchadnezzar-megolm.github.io/#remediesfixes

Comment · 3 years ago
We explain how this works in Appendix A of https://nebuchadnezzar-megolm.github.io/static/paper.pdf but it's also a nice little exercise to work out how this breaks confidentiality. TL;DR: Yes, the plaintext coming out is not what you'd expect ("breaks decryption") but in a predictable way.

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