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Comment · 1 month ago
> I'll send you an e-mail from my address and I'll ask Vhyrro to forward the original emails to you again.

Much appreciated

> Messaging or tagging you there about an unpatched RCE would have effectively been a public zero-day disclosure, which we strictly wanted to avoid.

No one is saying that, huh? Are we following the same timeline? At this point you have emails out to me a Hisham. You aren't hearing back from us, it's been a while. The issue seems pretty bad. Any way of nudging either of us to check, "Hey, something important about LuaRocks, check your email" in a dm, or a message to anyone else related to LuaRocks. There's a million ways to get my attention without publicly disclosing the issue. Dang, even you could have sent an email.

> That, too, would have been a public disclosure.

I wasn't suggesting you publicly disclose. I'm trying to understand how you understood what was at stake. You have your own community of users with rocks.nvim consuming files through luarocks.org that would potentially be installing malware. I also asked you "Did you stop using LuaRocks?" I'm trying to assess if you just didn't see it as that severe of an issue.

Look, I fully accept your defense of "We did what was in SECURITY.md. Not our fault that the emails were never delivered. Anything else is outside our responsibility. " If you're just some random security researcher, I accept it. My argument is that you aren't a rando and you're more tied to the ecosystem, and have more responsibility. But maybe you disagree.

> Rather than going back and forth on motives, how about we focus on establishing a clearer direct line of communication for the future?

Yes, thank you! I've been waiting for email from anyone at this point. I tried to get info from Vhyrro way before this HN thread but got ignored https://github.com/vhyrro/luarocks-rce-proof-of-concept/issu...

> Since I did not conduct the research myself, I am not in a position to comment on the technical details of it.

You have enough intimate details of the situation to participate in a multi-day conversation with me on behalf of Vhyrro's work but conveniently don't know anything else? Were you a politician in another life? :)

I will follow up with your email, thanks

Sorry for all the snark, I hope you can at least empathize a little with my situation.

Comment · 1 month ago
Just wanted to follow up and say that Hisham confirmed with me he didn't receive any contact from Vhyrro. Feel free to have Vhyrro forward the emails again so I can find out why all their attempts to report the issue disappeared into both of our spam folders. You are building something very relevant to LuaRocks.org, you should have a direct line of contact with me.

> Apart from that, we couldn't find any alternative way of reaching you.

I'll just be blunt, I find this very hard to believe.

I want to take a moment to express why I feel the way I do. If you were a random security researcher, then great. You tried to contact me, the emails got lost along the way. There isn't much you can do. But from what I can see, you're a member of the Lua community who actively uses LuaRocks.

Did you stop using LuaRocks while you were aware of this issue? Did you instruct other people not to use it within rocks.nvim? For all you knew, every module on the site could have been replaced with malware infecting anyone installing any package. The severity of this was a "drop everything and panic" scenario, not an "I asked a group chat, oh well."

When you say something like, "Apart from that, we couldn't find any alternative way of reaching you," it makes me scratch my head. I am grateful you tried to contact me, but statements like that make it hard for me to give you the benefit of the doubt regarding your attempts to contact me.

And that doesn't event address the parts you glossed over in your account of the situation, specifically the actual exploitation on the production server without clearly stating that from the get-go.

Comment · 1 month ago
Yes, I did thorough scan of my email, with Vhyrro's email, name and other keywords related to luarocks. Nothing was found. I asked Hisham to take a look for an email as well.
Comment · 1 month ago
> Vhyrro found your Gmail address and sent you an email on August 7th:

I just searched my email and found nothing. Do you have subject line, sender address or receipt or anything that would help me find the emails that were sent?

> found your personal Matrix handle. That's when Vhyrro DM'd you on Matrix.

I don't use Matrix. There's a gitter.im for Luarocks that's effectively dead. I last was there in January 2026 asking if the server was alive but never returned. I logged into gitter right now to check and I was able to find a DM request from August 20th, I wouldn't have seen this under any normal circumstances though

Well, thanks for sharing you attempted to contact me at least.

Comment · 1 month ago
In my opinion, this is a terrible display of "ethical" reporting.

For context, I built and run the luarocks.org website. It's very easy to see I run the website, and find my contact information. I appreciate that they eventually shared the exploit but...

* They sat on this vulnerability for over a month, likely trying to figure out how to fully exploit it, instead of reporting it. (I would imagine their ai agent upon seeing the `loadstring` issue told them "go tell the maintainer immediately", which they ignored)

* They finally reported it through an intermediate, CISA.gov, and never contacted me directly. When CISA eventually reached out to me, it took multiple days for me to get approved to view the report.

* When I got access to the report I stayed up all night doing deep investigation of logs, all packages and doing the server rebuild. I published the security bulletin on the luarocks.org website (https://luarocks.org/security-incident-september-2026) as soon as the server was rebuilt. They saw it and had time to write up this entire dramatized blog post but still haven't contacted me. (I asked for a follow-up through CISA, but I don't know how long those exchanges take.)

* The vulnerability was exploited on production luarocks.org during that time by them, and they failed to mention any production testing in any of their reports, both in the blog post and in the CISA.gov report.

* They position themselves as members of the Lua community, running alternative Lua runtimes and a new Lua package manager, yet they sat on a very critical issue that affected much of the Lua community for an extended period of time.

* Update: they replied to me on CISA, acknowledging that they exercised the exploit on the production server. (This is still not disclosed anywhere) They said they only did a "sleep" test, but our server logs contradict their attempts based on the accounts they revealed to be as part of their testing.

I get it, you found an exploit and you want credit for your hacking skills, but this whole exchange has really rubbed me the wrong way. Since they haven't told me what malicious code they ran on the production server, or verified what accounts they used to exploit the sever on production, it wastes my time when I'm doing forensics to analyze the extent of what happened to make the appropriate decisions incident response.

In the current era of LLM coding, anyone can vibe code a new Luarocks in Rust (or whatever is popular) over a weekend. I think that establishing trust is more important than ever, and this interaction just makes me question the maintainers of Lux. Their own self-interest appears to be above whatever they are trying to do for the Lua community at large.

Comment · 1 year ago
Throughout this our only contacts have been representatives at Stripe and PayPal. They indicated that they got a notice and kicked off their own audit.

As far as I'm aware, the Collective Shout letter caused a "formal card network inquiry" to originate from both Mastercard and Visa. I did not have access to the actual inquiry, but my assumption is that it wasn't "we see this content, take it down" and more like "we saw this letter, look into whats going on before we do our own investigation and fine you"

Comment · 1 year ago
Interesting, this morning I got a response from a staff member of the parent company that owns iwantmyname saying they didn't get my response with regards to the abuse notification they sent and that's why they took the domain down.
Comment · 1 year ago
Unfortunately the domain has a hold placed on it by the registrar, so I believe transferring is disabled. I also wouldn't want to risk doing a transfer at an hour when their staff aren't available to help with the current issue.
Comment · 1 year ago
I'm the one running itch.io, so here's some more context for you:

From what I can tell, some person made a fan page for an existing Funko Pop video game (Funko Fusion), with links to the official site and screenshots of the game. The BrandShield software is probably instructed to eradicate all "unauthorized" use of their trademark, so they sent reports independently to our host and registrar claiming there was "fraud and phishing" going on, likely to cause escalation instead of doing the expected DMCA/cease-and-desist. Because of this, I honestly think they're the malicious actor in all of this. Their website, if you care: https://www.brandshield.com/

About 5 or 6 days ago, I received these reports on our host (Linode) and from our registrar (iwantmyname). I expressed my disappointment in my responses to both of them but told them I had removed the page and disabled the account. Linode confirmed and closed the case. iwantmyname never responded. This evening, I got a downtime alert, and while debugging, I noticed that the domain status had been set to "serverHold" on iwantmyname's domain panel. We have no other abuse reports from iwantmyname other than this one. I'm assuming no one on their end "closed" the ticket, so it went into an automatic system to disable the domain after some number of days.

I've been trying to get in touch with them via their abuse and support emails, but no response likely due to the time of day, so I decided to "escalate" the issue myself on social media.

Comment · 2 years ago
Comment · 2 years ago
Comment · 2 years ago
I suppose I haven't really fully considered this use case, but...

There's no requirement to put your entire app in a location / {} block. You can freely use as many location blocks as you want, and those that you want to be rendered by Lapis can call serve to the app as normal.

eg.

location = /exact-match { content_by_lua 'require("lapis").serve("app")'; }

location /directory-match { content_by_lua 'require("lapis").serve("app")'; }

Keep in mind pattern matching will still happen in the app: You will need to define the routes handled by Lapis within the definition of the Lapis app. Why is it done this way? Primarily, for named routes. Typically you want to be able to generate the URL of a resource within your app's code, so by having routes defined in Lua you can easily reference those. Secondly, easy parameter parsing and the parameter validation.

> It's got some nice utilities that we use, but we ended up just using regular location {} routes each with their own content_by_lua code block and none of the lapis routing/handler stuff.

Although it's very possible to pick and choose what components to use, keep in mind that the `serve` function does some important work with connection pooling. If you are using any query related functionality outside of a dispatch it will open and close connections per request, which is not ideal for performance.

Comment · 3 years ago
Comment · 4 years ago
I'm curious, you folks probably make money off of fraud right? You probably have negotiated whatever dispute fee you pay processors directly well below the $15 you pass on to sellers, pocketing the difference.

So I'm guessing that Radar's price was set with this in mind, you ran the regression to set a price to ensure revenue does not decrease by having better fraud detection. Hence the super expensive price. If this wasn't the case, Radar probably would be free.

Probably creates a really bizarre incentive. You don't want to deal with obvious scams that hurt processing reputation, but you probably also want to make your built in fraud detection just crappy enough to ensure you capitalize on that revenue.

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