Recent submissions

Comment · 9 months ago
Comment · 1 year ago
Comment · 1 year ago
Local police already equipped with signal jammer cars. Usually only used in college entrance exam period. They also appeared in recent protest in Jiangyou city.
Comment · 1 year ago
Yeah, have used one. Mine was a downloadable eSIM and meant for foreign travelers with 1-week plan. It actually establishes an IPsec VPN to the origin country. Beijing dare not to block foreigners' roaming services.
Comment · 1 year ago
> ignore the forged RST+ACK

See <Ignoring the Great Firewall of China> in 2006. That won't work if RST/ACK was injected to both sides.

> Then it would come testing to see if sending a bunch of ACK packets, perhaps with sequence numbers that would when reconstructed could complete the handshake. Trying to send them alongside the SYN+ACK or even before if it can be predicted. Maybe try sending some packets with sequence id 0 as well to see what happens.

This is an interesting approach already being utilized, namely TCB desync. But currently most people tend to buy VPN/proxy services rather than studying this.

Comment · 1 year ago
OK, AWS again, I know it not only complies with Beijing but also Russia and many other dictatorships. Banned domain fronting and recently enforced S3 bucket-based subdomains for government to better inspect.
Comment · 1 year ago
Not all Western companies comply with Beijing, like Route53, a name I've never heard of; Cloudflare seems to be most popular in China.

But yeah, they can shutdown anything unless proxy server is widely used. as <Nearly 90% of Iranians now use a VPN to bypass internet censorship>.

Comment · 1 year ago
> How is traffic controlled inside PRC?

Unknown. I haven't seen any injected fake DNS or reset packets so far to domestic hosts. But there are rumors that Google's servers in Beijing (AS24424) was once black holed.

> Is GFW a central hub for all traffic between all hosts?

It's supposed to has centralized management system, but not a single hub.

> Or between residential ASNs and commercial ones only?

Yes, the injecting devices are deployed in IXPs, the AS borders. See <Internet censorship in China: Where does the filtering occur?>.

> In the UK and Iran a lot of censorship was implemented by leaning on ISPs at IP level (eg BT Cleanfeed) and with DNS blocks but I haven’t kept up to date with how networks might handle residential hosting.

I believe Iran has more centralized system like China controlled by Tehran.

> Maybe internal traffic is just all banned?

No, internal HTTPS traffic is not banned in that hour.

Comment · 1 year ago
Terrible, this is Internet curfew. It's not uncommon to imagine they'd shutdown Internet across border during any war (like against Taiwan).
Comment · 1 year ago

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