kernc
Joined 4 years ago
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49
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34
Member since
Mar 23
Recent submissions
Comment · 24 days ago
Comment · 24 days ago
> at least half is comments or unit tests
Thanks, I see there's a slight (~50%?) overestimation there, but then again, even unit tests and comments in a target programming language count as syntactically correct code that needs to be evaluated and reasoned upon. I'm not that familiar with Rust's runtime introspection features, but in languages like Python, even the comments can directly affect code (e.g. `Foo.__doc__ = Bar.__doc__ + SOME_ANNEX`).
> _generate_seccomp_filter ... the entire function doesn't block anything
Many thanks! I've applied a fix—it's a single line added. The missing test is pending a runnable that invokes one of the forbidden syscalls. As I have no qualms about force-pushing around a repo that nobody forks, happy to credit you(r LLM) proper!
> Main script invokes working directory's .env as shellcode
The sandboxed process can't overwrite existing .env files [1], but it could create a new $PWD/.env file, hoping to "escape" at next sandbox execution. That's a valid concern I'll have to think about some more.
[1]: https://github.com/sandbox-utils/sandbox-run/blob/c97d065184...
> Lots of race conditions
I sometimes experience "Slirp not ready in time" [2], but it's due to a so far unexplained upstream issue [3]. I you have time/tokens to spare, I'd appreciate those PRs and further similar feedback!
[2]: https://github.com/sandbox-utils/sandbox-run/blob/c97d065184... [3]: https://github.com/rootless-containers/slirp4netns/issues/35...
Don't know whether it's a good idea. It sure has got its issues. But even as the SLOC count and the number of bugs metrics are proved correlated in literature [4], min SLOC is not the primary target—a reasonably graspable and stable composition of few dependencies is. Whereas overreliance on third parties nowadays often ends with a rug pull one way or another. We simply can't count on this "MXC" (...) to be maintainable/non-archived even a year from now, just when I'd get it all properly integrated and set up.
[4]: https://softwareengineering.stackexchange.com/questions/1856...
> slightly concerned
Oh, I certainly wouldn't like to limit myself to promoting just this repo! ^D^ HN is a good venue, lots of smart people around! I see everyone shilling their own sh** all the time. Often in green usernames. :shrug:
Comment · 24 days ago
350,000 of mostly Rust SLOC [1] ... And the upstream sandboxes aren't even vendored!
I'd be way more confident building upon something I can grasp and understand. [2]
[1]: https://ghloc.dev/microsoft/mxc [2]: https://github.com/sandbox-utils/sandbox-run
Comment · 1 month ago
> executes outside the sandbox
Now, why would anyone do that? (Like everyone and their brother) I wrote my own simple Linux/shell-based sandbox [1] (I can trust ...) and am successfully running PyCharm whole inside it ...
Comment · 3 months ago
The convergence is ongoing. We are Borg. You will be assimilated.
Comment · 6 months ago
Why would they care to empower competitors?
Comment · 7 months ago
`sandbox-venv` is a small shell script that sandboxes Python virtual environments in separate Linux namespaces using Bubblewrap (and soon using only command `unshare`, bringing the whole script down to effectively 0 deps).
Comment · 7 months ago
Did you also manage to enable menu icons?
Comment · 7 months ago
Let everyone be reminded how joyful GIMP 2.10 menus used to look ...
Comment · 9 months ago
Probably not. Maybe Bubblewrap and sandbox-run. It's an anything-is-already-way-better-than-nothing type of thing.
Comment · 9 months ago
As a heads up and affirmation that the approach is correct, here's a small shell bubblewrap wrapper that boils the command line down to `sandbox-run claude --dangerously-skip-permissions`.
Comment · 9 months ago
Other actionable insights are:
- Merge amendments up into the initial prompt.
- Evaluate prompts multiple times (ensemble).
Comment · 9 months ago
It being deprecated and all, didn't feel like wrapping it, but macOS supposedly has a similar `sandbox-exec` command ...
Comment · 9 months ago
> Linux-only
What other dev OSs are there?
> once privileges are dropped [...] it doesn't appear to be possible to reinstate them
I don't understand. If unprivileged code could easily re-elevate itself, privilege dropping would be meaningless ... If you need to communicate with the outside, you can do so via sockets (such as the bind-mounted X11 socket in one of the readme Examples).
Comment · 9 months ago
Since everyone tends to present their own solution, I bid you mine:
sandbox-run npx @anthropic-ai/claude-code
You would not be aware of the amount of trust you are putting into that.