gcbw2

the term "pizzagate" was part of the disinformation to throw the actual investigation under the bus.

The press focused on a leaked report that it all happened in a small pizza place. While it effectively (for the leakers) killed progress of the investigation (the one which consequences are being talked now in this thread, so it was very much real) it also gave a catchy name for a while, that cause real investigative reports to jump in.

fake news is a very interesting problem to follow.

He was clearly wrong, as the truly rich/big corporations do not pay taxes and take most from the state.

Not talking about a hacker. I am stating that the described hash dance offers no exclusion from GDPR as saying "we promise we won't look" would do.

My point about brute forcing being useless, is that you hold all the information needed to re-create the hash. All but one tiny piece that is the random number. so brute force is a very effective O(<tiny piece size>). And since it is stored in your locally available data, there is no rate constraints.

"Hey company in shenzen that i suspect is a shady front to illegal data mining business, do you have any data on me? i'm john doe, living at 123 naive st #42, phone number 555-555-555, national registry number 1234556. You can reply to me on this same email address. thank you. PS: maybe i filled this in an webform, so please do not attach this new info to all the traffic/behaviour you previously collected from your TV on this same IP address"

i.e. "exiting"

If a search query on your data would contain all the components of the original hash, i don't have to walk backwards and break the hash. i just have to hash my query terms in the same way.

Also I suggested you store the daily hash forever. But even if you really erase it every day, as you say, If you or an attacker makes the same request every day at a predetermined time, when you/they get your logs, you/they can use that predictable request to get the daily secret too.

I consider the information to be stored in plain text, and that you would have to have requested permission just the same. You pretty much have an identifiable user (via IP/UA/access time) stored in your logs.

Anonymization is removal of information, not encoding it in a convoluted hash.

This is still logging everything the GDPR says you can't without asking for consent, but you made your search convoluted (but not less efficient if you have all the pieces) to (suggest|lie?) that you need to break the hash and that's why you don't need consent.

None of the information you are using on the hash wouldn't be in the search query itself! ip, user agent, path, date, etc. So there is no way to reverse the hash. You just hash your search query and compare in O(1) time.

The only piece of information that realistically makes the hash slightly difficult to get is the random number refreshed every day. But either you store it (and i have no reason to believe you do not) or it make the brute force effort trivial as I only need to generate the hash with that variable now.