galadran

All the design needed was for the browser to check the TLS cert and the QWAC cert covered the same domain name. Instead, folks at ETSI insisted very stubbornly on the signature from the QWAC over the cert used in TLS - which is an annoying complication for site operators - and provides little additional benefit.

I'd also like to see the EU encode more information in these certs. Knowing a company's address is not very useful (IMO), but a machine readable label that the site is regulated by $COUNTRY_NAME financial or medical regulator would be a much more useful signal.

Good luck in your endeavours!

However, there are obligations to display 2-QWACs if sites choose to use them. Their keys are not used to authenticate web domains or encrypt web traffic.

Disclosure: I was Mozilla's lead for this effort and also helped design 2-QWACs (for my sins).

All of these libraries also support the hybrid forms, which have different codepoints and are used by default. Nothing in the IETF process has any bearing on this.

There are already codepoints assigned for MLKEM 512/768/1024 (0x0200, 0x0201, 0x0202) and nearly every major library supports it already:

  - OpenSSL (ML-KEM-512/768/1024)
  - BoringSSL (ML-KEM-1024)
  - NSS (ML-KEM-1024)
  - AWS-LC (ML-KEM-512/768/1024)
  - Rustls (ML-KEM-768/1024)
  - s2n-tls (ML-KEM-1024)
  - Bouncy Castle (ML-KEM-512/768/1024)
  - Botan (ML-KEM-512/768/1024)
  - GnuTLS (ML-KEM-768/1024)
  - WolfSSL (ML-KEM-512/768/1024)