emidln

We don't know that it's once per device. It's been said by Google that it'll be once per device, but we haven't seen the code and we don't know the method of tracking that. What if I wipe my OS? What if I wipe data in play services? Will a future silent play services update conveniently break my p2p messaging app during a protest?

The quality of GenAI PRs scales with the driver. Many are low-effort, ill-considered, overly verbose and otherwise bad. I've seen decades of similar patches/PRs from humans.

If it "looks like claude" in that it's overly verbose (in code or comments), missing tests, etc then it should be rejected for lack of merits. If the only indication is "this user fixed 10 bugs in an hour" and the PRs are otherwise fine on the merits, rejecting the PRs because an LLM wrote them is the same as rejecting them because you know they're from an emacs user.

If you think you can identify frontier model-generated planned and reviewed c/c++ from human-generated planned and reviewed c/c++, I've got some bad news for you.

The "no slop" policy is the same as it ever was: garbage has to make it through patch code review. If an LLM wrote it rather than a human and it passes patch review, it's fine. Rejecting features or fixes because a probabilistic algorithm said "should look like this" feels a lot like rejecting c/c++ because you read Intel's docs and have a hex editor.

Edit: s/like like/look like/

If an airline pilot is so bereft of fortitude that they perceive a political wifi network name as a threat, they should be disallowed command of the aircraft. They need therapy. Mental weakness like this should not be tolerated in those responsible for the safe operation of human lives.

At least on a personal max account, I can't max every window. There is also weekly limit. If I max every window, I run out of tokens halfway through the week.

I probably enjoy ELF hacking more than most, but patching an ELF binary via LD_PRELOAD, linker hacks, or even manual or assisted relinking tricks are just tools in the bag of performant C/C++ (and probably Rust too, but I don't get paid to make that fast). If you care about perf and for whatever reason are using someone else's code, you should be intimately familiar with your linker, binary format, ABI, and OS in addition to your hardware. It's all bytes in the end, and these abstractions are pliable with standard tooling.

I'd usually rather have a nice language-level interface for customizing implementation, but ELF and Linux scripting is typically good enough. Binary patching is in a much easier to use place these days with good free tooling and plenty of (admittedly exploit-oriented) tutorials to extrapolate from as examples.

I wish env -S was more portable. It's a newer feature of the coreutils env implementation and isn't supported elsewhere afaik.

How: You've ran the test on a bunch of hosts and create a spec from ranges.

Why: you might be concerned with network connectivity (you don't get to choose which data center you launch in and it might not be exactly equal), noisy neighbors on shared hosts, etc. if you're measuring for networking, you probably are spinning ups separate accounts/using a bank of accounts and something in every az until you find what you're looking for.

I'm not a CISO just a random dog on the internet, but this open letter seems to assume that privacy is not a part of your security posture and that spear phishing isn't common these days. (Is 'spear phishing' still the term for targeted electronic scams to steal credentials/access?)

I realize not everyone is using a physically stripped burner, a graphene os install, etc and not everyone works at a high value financial, govt, or infra target but for those of us who need to deal with opsec or are commonly targeted by spear phishing this advice seems abysmal.

In the current political climate of the US, if you are living or traveling here and the current party isn't cheering for you personally, you really should be considering both state-sponsored attacks and no longer have the luxury of assuming good faith by the state. Telling people to enable cheap drive by attacks that are in active use by certain government agencies is irresponsible malpractice at best and actively evil at worst.

Source: I've worked at analytics companies that actively deanonymized users using cookies when available. We used wifi and Bluetooth details when available. We built "multi channel marketing" which was just taking any information we could scrape from the user to fingerprint them and cross reference and deanonymize them so we could sell interactions to businesses like geofenced price discrimination, value of users, and could offer cross website information on shopping habits/financial profile. The shit I did 15 years ago didn't go away and no matter how much I wish I didn't write that, it was the tip of the iceberg and relatively benign.

> Forward collision warning has misfired on 2 occasions on me in the last 3 years

My Lexus is afraid of a bush behind my garage in the alley. It's on a neighbors property and not really overgrown, but my car refuses to get within about 5 ft of it. Makes backing out a nightmare. I haven't figured out a way to disable it, and have considered just selling this 2025 NX.

If you can be prosecuted for guessing urls you can be prosecuted for sending garbage data in a way you know will be uploaded to a remote system.

I suspect this data is made "anonymous" and sold to insurance companies and misc data brokers. If it's linked to my insurance company, I don't want to jack my rates. Further, I've thus far avoided a CFAA conviction and I'd like to keep it that way.

My 2025 Mazda Miata has a CAN connected Telematics Control Unit that sends a bunch of data to Mazda on ignition off. Among this data is acceleration and velocity data along with coordinates sampled for where you were. It is also used as a gateway for the Mazda app to start your car, query your vehicle's tire pressure, etc. It is claimed that you can opt out of this by calling Mazda and being persistent.

The CAN traffic is unencrypted. It was pretty easy to MITM this module with a cheap arm Linux board and a can transceiver to enable writing a two way filter capable of blocking the traffic that didn't raise any DTCs (that I observed) and could be turned on/off by the user. I preferred this approach to complete disconnection of the module (which is noticeable via errors at the diagnostic port) or trying to faraday cage or disable the antennae on the TCU so it can't remotely send/receive. I can also turn off my module or completely remove it before I sell it.

I fear the next version of Miata will be an encrypted CAN like most other cars have moved to and even with my expertise I won't be able to access the latest safety features from new cars without surrendering what little privacy I've been able to claw back.