elliottinvent

Joined 9 years ago

Karma
330
Submissions
193
Member since
Nov 25
Founder of NUM [1], always happy to hear from HN folks – elliott dot brown at the domain in [1]

1. https://www.num.uk

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It was recently explained to me:

Introverts charge their battery in solitude and discharge it socialising. Extroverts the opposite.

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Thanks for the heads up, home page or any page in particular?

It’s ok for me but I’ll check the logs.

It’s just a basic fly.io setup at the moment but it should be more than capable of dealing with the traffic - just html (and htmx) front end and Sinatra back end.

It stood up pretty well to the traffic last time.

Comment · 3 years ago
Oh and to prevent what happened last time (the post getting flagged as an overheated discussion), I'm going to close the laptop and come back to this in a few hours! So if you ask a question, I'm not ignoring you – I'll respond later.
Comment · 3 years ago
Thanks for this really interesting feedback – especially that the subdomain method could create more opportunities for cache poisoning.

Interested to explore how a cache poisoning attack might be easier on a Domain Verification protocol TXT record compared to a DNS-01 TXT record.

Given the scenario: an attacker is attempting to claim a domain (example.com) with service provider (SP1) who uses a DNS revolver (DR1) I don’t immediately see how the subdomain approach makes a cache poisoning attack easier.

Couldn’t the attacker similarly keep asking DR1 for <rand>._acme-challenge.example.com and spam back NS delegation answers for _acme-challenge.example.com, with the goal that upon cache poisoning success, they could fraudulently claim example.com with SP1?

I may have overlooked something here, if so please explain.

With either method, DNSSEC would definitely seem the solution as you’ve suggested.

Comment · 3 years ago
Interesting idea.

If I understand correctly, let’s say a popular CDN was no longer maintained and the domain expired, eg popularcdn.com - you’re looking for a way to use a dns record lookup to verify that the domain (and cdn) is still controlled by who you think it is?

I guess for scripts this can be dealt with using integrity hashes but that’s version specific. So this would be a security check at a domain level?

I guess the hard part would be that any CDN hijacker could copy the DNS TXT record when they hijack it.

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