dcsommer

Joined 13 years ago

Karma
759
Submissions
252
Member since
Jul 5
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Recent submissions

Comment · 1 month ago
That's reductive. Without coordinated cooperation, enough actors will defect so game theory plus market forces will force acceleration on the frontier overall.
Comment · 1 month ago
Comment · 3 months ago
Sure they care about elegance, or at least brevity. Minimizing tokens out, or generally "token efficiency," is part of the objective function for these systems. It doesn't mean they are perfect at it though.
Comment · 3 months ago
What is the binary size comparison including wasm + js?
Comment · 4 months ago
Comment · 5 months ago
Codecs are difficult and expensive to develop. Therefore they get reused in many contexts, including security critical ones. Sandboxing is shown over and over to not be a great security solution, so what this means in practice is that security-critical software that needs software decoding get pwned because software engineers don't care to prioritize it in the first place.

Why shouldn't safety be the default? If you really want to, it wouldn't be too hard to maintain a patch on top of rustc to drop the bounds checks if you want to compile object files without them.

Software decoding has a safety culture problem, and we need to talk about it.

Comment · 5 months ago
Performance should not be priority #1. Security should be. Why do we slow down all CPUs to prevent SPECTRE attacks yet continue to write in C? As rav1d shows, the perf loss is far less to migrate from C to Rust than it is to apply SPECTRE mitigations, and adding a sandbox around a memory-unsafe codec is going to be way more expensive again than using Rust code to start.
Comment · 6 months ago
How is this POV compatible with the exploitable vulnerabilities, caused by memory safety, found in openh264, x264, dav1d, and practically every video decoder out there?
Comment · 6 months ago
We must not continue to develop media codecs in memory unsafe languages. Small, auditable sections can opt-out perhaps, but choosing default-unsafe for this type of software is close to professional negligence.
Comment · 8 months ago
I think GP is simply identifying a potential popular niche that could be satisfied in a future city builder game, which seems quite on topic.
Comment · 9 months ago
Just for reference, Wamedia ships on the major Meta apps and on iOS, Android, Desktop, and Web platforms.
Comment · 9 months ago
We invested a lot into build system optimizations to bring this number down over time, although we did accept on the order of 200 KiB size overhead initially for the stdlib. We initially launched using a Gradle + CMake + Cargo with static linking of the stdlib and some basic linker optimizations. Transitioning WhatsApp Android to Buck2 has helped tremendously to bring the size down, for instance by improving LTO and getting the latest clang toolchain optimizations. Buck2 also hugely improved build times.
Comment · 9 months ago
Great reading to see beyond the clichéd, sanitized retellings of that era. It really makes you consider the prices paid for what some call progress.
Comment · 11 months ago
Great work by the MS team. It is great progress to shift OOB access into a controlled crash. These kinds of panic bugs are then easy to remediate, with clear stack traces, as we see in the turn around time from the report.
Comment · 1 year ago
> basically fine

How many type confusion 0 days and memory safety issues have we had in dynamic language engines again? I've really lost count.

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