csandreasen
Joined 15 years ago
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Comment · 10 years ago
Comment · 10 years ago
This is an installation banner, as in: "You've successfully installed LNMP"
From the LNMP GitHub page:
This script is written using the shell, in order to quickly deployLEMP/LAMP/LNMP/LNMPA(Linux, Nginx/Tengine/OpenResty, MySQL in a production environment/MariaDB/Percona, PHP), applicable to CentOS 5~7(including redhat), Debian 6~8, Ubuntu 12~15 of 32 and 64.
Comment · 10 years ago
CNN and the Washington Post both reported that WhatsApp and Telegram were found on several of the Paris attackers' phones, but that the content wasn't able to be recovered.
http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/politics/paris-attacks-terrori...
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/paris-attack-pla...
Comment · 10 years ago
From your link:
(c) The term “confidential communication” includes any communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes a communication made in a public gathering or in any legislative, judicial, executive or administrative proceeding open to the public, or in any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded.
Comment · 10 years ago
Absolutely. If a business is offering services that a customer is using to commit a crime, the police wouldn't be doing their jobs if they didn't go down and ask for logs.
Comment · 10 years ago
That's interesting. They've come pretty close to that line in the past...
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/tea-party-taxes-and-wh...
Comment · 10 years ago
Probably about as much as you see from him on the subject of Russia and China. The Intercept is about as unbiased as Fox News - lots of criticism directed towards the US and its allies, silence on every other country.
Comment · 10 years ago
A gaping "backdoor" already exists in the form of the software update mechanism. By the same logic you're using, Apple can't keep their source code and signing key secure forever, which would be a much worse leak than them losing control of a modified iOS that would let someone brute force a PIN for a phone in their physical possession without the phone being wiped.
Comment · 10 years ago
This is more like the FBI asking the storage unit owner to turn off the security system that he installed that incinerates the contents of the storage unit when someone tries to pick the lock, but only on the unit that the FBI has a warrant to search. The storage unit owner then responds that although he could put an off switch on that particular unit, it's an outrage and sets a horrible precedent that the police should ever ask him to turn off his security incinerator.
Comment · 10 years ago
By that same logic, Apple's source code and software update key could eventually leak, too, which would have even worse effect. The FBI is handing the phone over to Apple to apply the modification, not asking Apple to them the means to do it themselves. If Apple was really worried about this leaking, they could just delete it when they're done (though it would be more work for them to recreate it next time the FBI comes with a warrant to search another iPhone).
Comment · 10 years ago
Demanding keys would conflict with the 5th Amendment; in the few cases that I'm aware of[1][2] where a defendant was successfully compelled to decrypt their files, the suspect had either already demonstrated that the evidence was in their possession and thus given up their right to self- incriminate or been granted immunity. Also, with end-to-end encryption law enforcement won't be able to decrypt regardless of whether or not they have a warrant, and they need a warrant to initiate a wiretap to begin with.
Comment · 10 years ago
I don't think that's an appropriate analogy. You may as well just say "In the 1700s, if you wrote an enciphered letter..." since cryptography isn't a new concept. Various schemes have been used to protect military and diplomatic communications for centuries. If you did so then or now, you wouldn't be under any obligation to reveal the contents, but you take on the additional burden of actually performing all of the necessary calculations, securely destroying the scratch paper you used in the process of encrypting the message, handling key management and distribution, securing the areas where the encrypting/decrypting is taking place (you wouldn't want the redcoats barging in the hour or so while you're in the middle of converting the plaintext to ciphertext), etc.
Nobody does that anymore. You're instead using a tool that someone else made, and either that tool or the other person is handling all of the hard work. Tools definitely can be regulated - I need a license to drive; I need to register my car; I need to go through a background check to own a gun; I can own a gun, but if I misuse it I go to jail; felons can't purchase guns legally; I can't buy a nuclear weapon or the fissile material needed to make own.
The questions that policymakers are fumbling through right now are things like "how (if at all) do we regulate tools and the companies that make/distribute them if those tools allow people evade law enforcement?"
Comment · 10 years ago
First off, Martin Luthor King didn't kill himself, so you can't really say that the FBI compelled him to do so.
Secondly, you're using the actions taken by a domestic law enforcement agency more than half a century ago as evidence that a foreign intelligence agency is going to blackmail Americans, neglecting the difference in missions between the two agencies, the changes in legal authorities since the 60s, the fact that multiple generations of Americans with differing cultural values have come into and left government service, etc.
Thirdly, calling someone ignorant is an insult. I'd suggest consulting the forum guidelines linked at the bottom of the page.
There were 81 e-mail chains from her server that should have been marked as classified because they contained classified information (and thus shouldn't have been sent over unclassified e-mail). Quite a few outlets have made the mistake of conflating being marked as classified with containing classified information. The thehill.com article links to another article using the phrase 'Twenty-two emails in eight different chains of messages were [marked as top secret]', but the article they link to says 'The Obama administration will entirely withhold 22 emails from Hillary Clinton’s private server because they have been classified as “top secret,”...'.
The point of classification markings is to unambiguously identify that the document contains classified information, what parts are classified and how to protect it. If it's not marked as such, there's the possibility that the recipient(s) won't realize that there's classified information in it. The most likely reason that the e-mails with classified information were sent in the first place was most likely that the sender didn't realize that the information was classified, or there might be differences in opinion between multiple government organizations as to whether a particular is classified or to what degree it is classified. An example is drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen - according to CIA that information is classified, but you could read about it in the newspapers.
Based on the description from factcheck.org, I was able to find two of e-mails with the (C) portion marks: [2],[3] Note that [3] was not redacted because it was classified, but rather due to FOIA exemption (you can see that everything after the (C) was left unredacted). [2] was redacted on account of both containing confidential information in the last paragraph as well as FOIA exemption.
[1] https://vault.fbi.gov/hillary-r.-clinton/hillary-r.-clinton-... (page 20)
[2] http://graphics.wsj.com/hillary-clinton-email-documents/pdfs...
[3] http://graphics.wsj.com/hillary-clinton-email-documents/pdfs...