crnkovic

> whether the massive vulnerability you discovered was fixed.

Which massive vulnerability in particular? You'll have to be more specific, haha.

I confirmed the Firestore collections had some kind of server-side security rules added before publishing the post.

Glad you enjoyed it.

Who knows!

Thank you! Glad you enjoyed it.

Thanks! I'm glad you found it as interesting and thrilling as I did while discovering each (exponentially worse) mistake.

The problem with these tools is that they're extremely complicated to set up and use. Grandma wants a phone number, not a v3 Tor Onion Service address.

I'm interested in usable E2EE messaging apps -- that's what I compared Converso to. Whatever this is (I will read the docs some day) is in another realm.

> This is basically an indirect validation that most non listed messaging apps supposedly offering e2e encryption such as Whatsapp or Signal have backdoors with access from any government asking for access.

More likely: the government doesn't want to cause 'too much' discomfort among ordinary citizens. The decision to not block popular apps such as WhatsApp is probably purely political.

> if this was a non-issue they wouldn't be patching it

As far as I can tell, nobody is claiming it's a 'non-issue'. Rather, it's a minor issue with an impact that is greatly exaggerated or sensationalised by the person reporting it.

This appears to be a description of a theoretical attack to cause a specific target networked Bitcoin node to consume quite a bit of bandwidth by returning blockchain data to the attacker. It doesn't seem like this would have any effect on the Bitcoin network at large, however. While I don't doubt that there exists an obscure client vulnerability that could be patched, it seems far-fetched and alarmist to categorise this as a "bitcoin exploit".