bruo
Joined 15 years ago
Joined 15 years ago
The author probably knows how complicated it's to write (he is a professional writer), and still manages to do it good enough to get some prizes for his work https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cory_Doctorow#Awards
https://github.com/subgraph/fw-daemon
it provides a very close experience to little snitch
Conversations.im was (or is, haven't checked in a month) logs encrypted chats on cleartext by default, and history shows why that is a bad idea [0]
Until today I haven't seen a single XMPP that protects metadata, the roster is always on cleartext, to support omemo you are storing yet more info always, etc.
If the answer to Signal issues is XMPP, there is a lot of work to do before to even suggest going this path.
At least in the global south, most of radical activists groups have strong "no-internet policies" for any type of secret, and no cellphones ones for their work. They have learned with their own history what they can or can't do, learned how to deal with IRL infiltration, and even learned how to communicate without any kind of contact or even agreements between groups. To survive and act against dictatorships or invading armies is not easy, they had to be smart.
But still, because travelling is expensive and networking today is a need for some of those groups or collectives, they can communicate with each other talking about their resolutions or activities, which are not secret (as I already said, it's assumed there can be a IRL infiltrate) but they are also not public.
You can see SMTP and mailing lists as a huge security risk, and they are, it's just not very common to see people that assume the opposite around here.
I know two, at least. For a small communitary school in my city, teachers and students keep blogs in a wordpress multi user server, for storing data or doing webdev examples. They have a subdomain setup and cannot use ssl as the domain name will always be unknown by the person who creates the blog and the wildcard is too expensive for something they do in their free time.
Sandstorm uses unknown subdomains as a way to avoid possible security issues https://docs.sandstorm.io/en/latest/administering/wildcard/#...
I'm sure your points are valid, but you cannot define the thread model of others so easy. And don't get mad by downvotes, upvoting or downvoting is pretty boring
If it's as concepts, "human rights" triggers less alarms than anonymity, first because while I don't know which regimes you consider oppressive there is a big probability they themselves think they comply and/or promote human rights. Iran for example have a Islamic Human Rights Commission and proudly promote it. Israel would be another country that fits this example.
Then we have that anonymity could mean something it scares them the most, which is not human rights defenders but spying. Tor is already in a bad list for this reason, same as any anonymity software. The biggest threat those countries face is still military intervention or terrorism. A friend was arrested while taking pictures in Palestine, when questioned he was asked if he had Tor or i2p installed, PGP or any encryption software on his laptop. They didn't took his laptop away, but that was before the switch to "human rights" brand.
Then there is another vector we can take, Tor as circunvention. Another friend when visiting sudan got a pamflet to not use Tor, VPNs or Proxies when asked for the visa. The hotel made the same requeriment. This was 4 years ago. The reason was not that Sudan has been in the list of the worst human rights offenders but that you could access immoral content with it.
So, while I understand the point, it doesn't seem to have a backed reality to be sustained.
When i was a kid a friend of my grand mother was arrested because a neighbor said he was a communist. He was tortured for a week and his party, kind of center/right wing took him out as they were a close party to the current government. Oppressive regimes usually don't need evidences.
A friend of mine was arrested for two years, accused for terrorism. The proofs? a war and peace copy (not even a photocopied book) and a guns and roses poster. And this was in "democracy"... so stupid proofs are also used, and whatever can be a proof, like a book about cubism was considered that was a book of cuba's ideology.
Tor has been for years looked by "regular"/"normal"/"common" people as a tool for drug dealers or child molesters. The switch to a human rights tool doesn't seem to really put it more into the illegal line.
Anyway, oppressive regimes do whatever they want, Tor can avoid some of the spying but if the state is already taking your computer you are screw up with Tor or without it.
It also removes the complexity of having to deploy let's encrypt certificates every X months without storing the LE's account key online. But if they release certificates for anybody claiming to be you there is no advantage in this area.
The bug itself is small and it lead to a whole system compromise, and the title is very good to guide us to the point they are trying to make… memory corruption is a problem and that needs to be addressed at early stages even, even if the overhead seems not worth it.