bren2013
Joined 13 years ago
Joined 13 years ago
Not key compromise, but general mis-issuance:
Facebook detected overreach by a vendor with CT: https://www.facebook.com/notes/protect-the-graph/early-impac...
AGL detected certs that were malformed in various ways: https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/08/01/ctpilot.html
> Technically CT is still not required.
It produces an interstitial, see: https://invalid-expected-sct.badssl.com/
Right now, the way key compromise might be detected in RPKI is that a human network operator notices a signed object which is obviously suspicious and posts it on a mailing list. This is the same way that CA compromise was detected in the Web PKI before CT.
CT was useful well before Chrome used their weight to make it required for all new certificates because it was no particular burden on a few people (CA or not) who saw a lot of certificates to add them to CT. This gave the people who might not see a lot of certificates but want to find something weird a corpus to dig into.
Same idea applies to RPKI. But yes, setting up Cirrus took very little of my time.
- A central API where the bootloader can do arbitrary validation on the API responses.
- WebTorrent, Scuttlebutt, IPFS PubSub, etc.
Typical example: Certificate authorities distribute CRLs primarily through untrusted channels and third parties to lower their operating cost. The CRLs are signed so its a win-win for everybody.