axsharma
Joined 6 years ago
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262
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Member since
May 25
Recent submissions
Comment · 2 months ago
Doesn't require a permissions bypass or a prompt, that's the point. Every agent here ships a workspace trust prompt but the payload fires before it's shown. `--dangerously-skip-permissions` is therefore irrelevant as the permission system never got consulted.
Delivery isn't self-inflicted either. A colleague sends you a zip or a client hands over a codebase. Inspecting `.git/config` before opening a shared project isn't standard practice. Pointing an agent at a project you were sent is what agents are for and exactly why these tools ship a workspace trust prompt. The issue here is that it fires too late.
Comment · 1 year ago
> "even if they've been a malicious actor the whole time"
That is a sound argument, even if integrity of the package was to check out (if npm tracks this internally at all).
Better to adopt a PyPI-style approach of temporarily "quarantining" packages while investigating allegations of malware for big-scale projects. Instead npm pulled the plug outright stating: "This package contained malicious code and was removed from the registry..." (generic placeholder page), which is inaccurate and likely to cause panic. https://www.npmjs.com/package/stylus
Comment · 1 year ago
Why not instead remove 'panya' as a maintainer from legitimate packages that were unaffected? No recent or malicious versions of Stylus have been published (which generally is the case during a hijack) and no evidence that any were altered. Stylus is relied upon by several popular frameworks including Angular 12. Admins should have at least checked this before pressing the kill switch.
Fwiw, npm appears to be restoring access to the project https://github.com/stylus/stylus/issues/2938#issue-325479314...
Comment · 1 year ago
Interesting, blogged about this Feb 5th https://www.sonatype.com/blog/fake-vs-code-extension-on-npm-...
Comment · 2 years ago
Close, that's more gray with a tint.
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