asayler

Joined 11 years ago

Karma
88
Submissions
14
Member since
May 28
[ my public key: https://keybase.io/asayler; my proof: https://keybase.io/asayler/sigs/EXiPlucVriRwPCtYk7lPfXBHLFhTOuQaGBC-0H-Wizo ]
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Recent submissions

Comment · 10 years ago
In general, locally added roots are trusted above all else -- and will even override cert pinning on most systems. Thus, if a user were to manually re-add the Wosign or Startcom roots to the local Mozilla trust store, they would continue to be trusted.
Comment · 10 years ago
Yes, the Startcom roots are included in the set to be distrusted. Mozilla is allowing Startcom to re-apply sooner than Wosign, but both will have to go through the entire CA vetting process again, and Startcom will also have to prove it's no longer controlled by Wosign.
Comment · 10 years ago
Comment · 11 years ago
Fixed.
Comment · 11 years ago
It seems that they got a license from the Italian Government to export their items to other Wassenaar countires: https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/07/07/leaked-documen....

Although it will be interesting to see if anything in the recent dump shows them violating the terms of that license or committing other Wassenaar violations between 2014 when the EU implemented it and now.

Comment · 11 years ago
This story has surfaced a few times now via various publications. I think the assertion that Wassenaar is the issue here is highly flawed.

First, since this student is operating in the UK and, as far as I can tell, is a UK citizen, the proposed US Wassenaar implementation and FAQs have no bearing on him. Instead, I belive he is just bound by the EU implmention of Wassenaar, which unlike the proposed US rules, more-or-less mirrors the original 2013 text exactly: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX.... So any discussion related to what BIS is planning to do is irrelevant to this case. And even if he were a US-based US citizen, it would still be irrelevant since the US rules are still in the proposed stage and aren't even in effect yet.

Second, Wassenaar explicitly exempts anything "in the public domain", as well as all mass-market software, from control under the General Software Note. This is generally interpreted to include any open source code or even publically-available object code, as well as academic research publications.

Finally, the Wassenaar control mechanism for the Class 4 items operates as a secondary control. First it defines "Intrusion software" as:

"Software" specially designed or modified to avoid detection by 'monitoring tools', or to defeat 'protective countermeasures', of a computer or network-capable device, and performing any of the following: the extraction of data or information, from a computer or network-capable device, or the modification of system or user data; or the modification of the standard execution path of a program or process in order to allow the execution of externally provided instructions.

But it does not attempt to control "Intrusion Software" directly. Instead it goes on to control:

4.A.5: Systems, equipment, and components therefor, specially designed or modified for the generation, operation or delivery of, or communication with, "intrusion software". 4.D.4: "Software" specially designed or modified for the generation, operation or delivery of, or communication with, "intrusion software". 4.E.1.c: "Technology" for the "development" of "intrusion software".

So individual exploits such as the ones discussed here are not even controlled. Only software designed for the operation, delivery, or control of systems compromised or targeted by such exploits (e.g. think Metasploit, ignoring the open-source and mass-market exemption that likely apply to it).

So it seems like a reach to assert that Wassenaar would control the discussed research, and even if it did, the research could still be published and/or released to the general public without infringing Wassenaar under the General Software Note exemptions.

The issue here seems much more about an Ethics Boards that has little understanding of the ethics of best-practice coordinated disclosure or basic academic freedoms. Wassenaar and the proposed US implementation has many issues, but this doesn't seem to be one of them.

Comment · 11 years ago
But isn't the blacklist you link to in the article specifically for queued TRIM? E.g. https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9a9324d. SO either that blacklist has nothing to do with this issue (in which case it probably shouldn't be linked from the article), or it does, and we're talking about issues with queued TRIM.

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