Qasaur
Joined 12 years ago
Joined 12 years ago
Lawyers are informed by ancient case law and bankers leverage trade instruments with roots in medieval Italy. Why is the software profession so exceptional that replacing hundreds of years of engineering wisdom with blog posts on agentic workflows is considered best practice?
[1] https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-overview/
[2] https://developer.android.com/identity/digital-credentials
Apple/SwiftUI has accentColor for example where you can inject a brand colour. This is subtle but effective for UI differentiation - colour is a design primitive that evokes subconscious pattern recognition and can be more effective than a complicated design framework that forces a larger context switch in the user's mind.
None of their ISO 27001 certificates, aside from the premium one-offs with the vCISO, are accredited by any reputable ISO accreditation body. I would even argue that IAS, who accredited Prescient Security (mentioned as a reputable body in the article), has a questionable reputation and certainly gives off a pay-to-play impression.
You can look up the names of their partners below. The one body I found that is on the register (Accorp) is accredited by UAF, a known cert-mill accreditation body, and I’m not even sure it’s the same Accorp that Delve has partnered with.
For reference, you want a ISO certificate issued by a body accredited by UKAS (UK gov. adjacent non-profit), ANAB (ANSI), or equivalent, all government-recognised. This is normally the first thing I check whenever someone claims ISO 27001 certification and it is a great heuristic to validate certification rigour.
https://www.iafcertsearch.org/search/certification-bodies
Shockingly low levels of DD by everyone involved here.
NixOS is used for declarative and more importantly deterministic OS state and runtime environment, layered with dm-verity to prevent tampering of the Nix store. The root partition, aside from whatever is explicitly configured in the nix store, is wiped on every reboot. The ephemerality prevents persistence of any potential attacker, and the state of the machine is completely identical to whatever you have configured in your NixOS configuration, which is great for audibility. This OS image + boot loader is signed with organisation-private keys, and deployed to machines preloaded with UEFI keys to guarantee boot integrity and preventing firmware-level attacks (UEFI secure boot).
At this point you need to trust the cloud provider to not tamper with the UEFI keys or otherwise compromise memory confidentiality through a malicious or insecure hypervisor, unless the provider supports memory encryption through something like AMD SEV-SNP. The processor provides an AMD-signed attestation that is provided to the guest OS that states "Yes, this guest is running in a trusted execution environment, and here are the TPM measurements for the boot" and you can use this attestation to determine whether or not the machine should join your network and that it is running the firmware, kernel, and initramfs that you expect AND on hardware that you expect.
I think I'll put together a write-up on this architecture once I launch the service. There is no such thing as perfect security, of course, but I think this security architecture prevents many classes of attacks. Bootkits and firmware-level attacks are exceedingly difficult or even impossible with this model, combine this with an ephemeral root filesystem and any attacker would be effectively unable to gain persistence in the system.
Does anyone know if there is a VM vendor that sits somewhere in between a dedicated server host like Hetzner in terms of performance + cost-effectiveness and AWS/GCP in terms of security?
Basically TPM/vTPM + AMD SEV/SEV-SNP + UEFI Secure Boot support. I've scoured the internet and can't seem to find anyone who provides virtualised trusted computing other than AWS/GCP. Hetzner does not provide a TPM for their VMs, they do not mention any data-in-use encryption, and they explicitly state that they do not support UEFI secure boot - all of these are critical requirements for high-assurance use cases.
Financial crises have been more severe, longer, and more sustained since the introduction of central banking. Let us also not forget that the industrial revolution and the extraordinary growth of Western economies in the late 1800s were mostly conducted under free banking without a central buyer and lender of last resort, and in some jurisdictions where a central bank existed it was regulated to follow a strict gold standard.
Every one of these charges happens every day and in some of them to a much greater scale in fiat, especially climate destruction due to inflationary monetary policy, which encourages consumption and waste and punishes thrift and savings.
- 1721 Mississippi bubble (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mississippi_Company)
- 1813-1836 Second Bank of the United States (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Bank_of_the_United_Stat...)
- 1933 FDR gold confiscation (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executive_Order_6102)
- 1939 UK gold confiscation under guise of national security (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Fish)
- 1971 unilateral termination of gold convertibility (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nixon_shock)
- 2008-present ECB/Fed/BoJ/BoE/global QE (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantitative_easing)
I don't know about the author but I have a feeling that the track record of central banks isn't exactly stellar, and I'd much rather trust a decentralised system with zero ability for sustained debasement than trust a small centralised group of people who have time and time again abused that trust.
I disagree with this but even if one assumes this to be the case, I'd much rather prefer a monetary system subject to the control of free market forces rather than the modern monetary system which is subject to a small group of unelected and unaccountable technocrats operating under the feeble assumption of central bank independence and whose power is extended through coercion and not voluntary association.
mengvall (at) mengvall.com
mengvall.com