MathsOX

Remember that this is about Ontario, not Canada. Ontario happens to be the largest sub-sovereign debtor in the world and has had spreads over underlying CAD govie benchmarks increase dramatically over the past few years.

Unless this plan is revenue neutral, which is likely not going to be the case, markets will continue to charge ever greater premiums for borrowing. Ontario desperately needs to get its fiscal house in order; it spends like it's a sovereign with the capacity to access a broad set of monetary and fiscal measures that only sovereigns have.

Well the line between traders and quants has always been blurry to the point of no differential at Jane Street, D.E Shaw, and Citadel since inception. Traders have always had quant background, but have focused on more execution-oriented analysis whereas quants are a bit more idea-oriented.

Any sell-side investment bank still has clear lines between traders and quants. In fact, while they blurred more pre-2007 I'd argue they've become more clearly defined.

Source: work at a prominent investment bank.

>That was really really dumb. They should have gone from 0.25 to 0.3 or something.

That's not how interest rate setting works at all. Plus, the Fed is still using a banded window that encapsulates your five basis point rise.

What company is borrowing at Fed Funds rates? If - theoretically, because we have to be quite theoretical to operate under your assumptions - a company was that exposed to interest rates and had zero hedge against interest rate vol they would not have the credit to hope to get funding anywhere near Fed Funds rates.

If you're surviving at the edge of loans (i.e - you're in a potential distressed scenario) you'll have bonds trading at a significant discount. This is exactly what began to happen during the early part of 2015, when Fed Fund futures had little chance of the Fed moving priced in.

A quote that stuck with me from a molecular biology class taken a year ago, "It's not who wins a Nobel Prize off of CRISPR work, it's how many there will end up being".

I'm not equating them absolutely, however I'm pointing out the Planatir began utilizing existing tech to make in roads into national defence while using that cash flow to create more proprietary technology that, once released, allowed the company to grow much quicker and that tech became it's mainstay. Presumably initial funding rounds and contracts were predicated on this being the strategy, not novel tech being utilized immediately (which is inline with what Theranos has done). The comparison stops there, at a macro level not micro level as you're describing, thus why only a sentence was devoted to it.

Yes, operating under the assumption early stage rounds were predicated on the technology existing and being sufficiently robust to carry out a certain percent of tests, that would be fraud.

Without knowing the term sheets and early investor negotiations that were held, I shy away from using the term fraudulent in the strict legal sense of the word.

Certainly you can argue more broadly that Theranos statements to the public over the past decade go beyond being disingenuous about their implementation of difficult technology and enter into fraudulent territory.

The latter half of that paragraph is articulating what I think Theranos is currently doing, not what I think they should have done.

What I said they should have done is described to their investors the business model that would act as a stop gap measure (gain market share and revenues by using existing technology) while allowing them to develop their proprietary technology to a point where it can get regulatory approval and can replace the already existing tech they're currently using.

> Leading investors to believe that you have technology that will be ready in 2011 when in reality you expect it to be ready in 2016 is not flipping a start up business model... It's just lying to get investor money

I've not seen any indication that rounds were predicated on certain delivery dates of the tech (what tech? what is the "success" percent? can the tech be augmented with more traditional tools?). If terms did get that specific, then there would be grounds for potential fraud.

Many in SV find it hard to grapple with traditional startups not penetrating health care to a greater degree; in Rise of the Robots (one of the Financial Times and The Economist books of the year) it's lamented for an entire chapter.

Traditionally the level of fundamental research and development displayed by Theranos - in areas of health or national defence - are done for years behind closed doors and then slowly rolled out to the public to mitigate any questioning of the underlying tech since the standards are understandably higher (i.e - it has to work from the start). This stands in contrast to the "move fast, break things" attitude pervasive in start-up culture.

I don't think there's anything necessarily fraudulent about Theranos, from what I've read, which seems to be the not-so-subtle undercurrent in much of the commentary. Rather they flipped the model startups should use in health, which is establish a business model that works and then work on preparatory tech in the background until it's ready to be rolled out. This seems to be largely what Theranos has done, but not what it's purposely chosen to articulate to the public and investors as it surely would have garnered less attention/funding. At this point Theranos seems to be playing the waiting game; waiting for their technology to reach a point where they can make a more transparent case for their business model and change the narrative once they've reached a point that's more aligned with the aspirations that have been articulated by Holmes for the past decade.

Once again, Peter Thiel's approach with Palantir looks to be extremely well executed and one that perhaps Theranos should have emulated.

Stanford has a transfer acceptance rate of 2%, so good for him. As for your second point, that's likely true, but it'll still be much more difficult for them to transfer than to get in straight out of High School (and impossible at schools like Princeton).

Every transfer at Harvard I know of was admitted to Harvard, but just decided to go elsewhere before deciding Harvard was the right choice.

I largely agree with this, but would add that traders (and even investment bankers in their 30s/40s) will work very little on the weekend. Certainly no senior trader is in the office.

Princeton doesn't do transfers, Harvard/Yale have 1-2% transfer acceptance rates, etc.

When transfers are admitted every year to my school (usually just 5-10) there's a writeup in the school paper about them. Without fail they all a) were accepted here, but chose to go to a similar/competing school like Princeton and b) are exceptionally accomplished at a young age.

I'm about half-way through the book. Very easy, enjoyable read. Left wondering why some of these Amazon reviews try to make it sound as if it's quite academically/technically rigorous.

That's fair. Would say that, in my experience, there wasn't much explicit nepotism at GS. If there was it'd be a case of someone's son getting good freshman/sophomore internships at small private equity shops, which made them a pretty sure merit-based bet getting into GS.