CarpaDorada

This doesn't sound plausible: according to Wikipedia, Eilenberg and Mac Lane introduced concepts of CT in 1942, and CT was originally used mainly homological algebra, with applications in logic/semantics later. Certainly CT was given credence by Grothendieck and Serre, working on (and solving) Weil's conjecture in the 50s and 60s. Lawvere's 1963 thesis predated categorical logic (according to his own words, <http://www.tac.mta.ca/tac/reprints/articles/5/tr5abs.html> p. 12, "but the method here, and indeed in the whole ensuing categorical logic, is to exploit the uniqueness by using adjointness itself as an axiom"). The first computer science department in the US was started in 1962 in Purdue University. Meanwhile for contrast the proofs of Church and Turing were published in 1936.

>I would wager that you can't name a logic not expressible in category theory.

I prefaced my statement with an "if"; you're not talking about toposes apparently. The interpretability of one theory in another is a concern of logicians and I'm not familiar with any restrictions on category theory, indeed it can be used for logics. I do not know topos theory but I was basing my statement on what I heard Colin McLarty say in an interview of his <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=81sPQGIWEfM>, can't give timestamp; he definitely named logics that cannot be expressed by the topos of a space.

I feel that you've used two straw men: 1) specifically naming US 2) ignoring my "if topos" and saying "expressible in CT".

The issue here is that you delegate trust to places like GitHub or other OIDC providers. You also have to trust Fulcio and their CAs. <https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/security/> for details. Maybe you don't want to do that, in part because you're not guaranteed that the service will remain free, or perhaps you're more serious about security than GitHub.

1-alt) Sign software with minisign.

Maybe I don't want to use Ed25519. Maybe I want to revoke the signatures. There's many issues one may have with minisign.

2) Signing git tags/commits

Advises to use SSH, no explanation why. Advises Ed25519, why not Ed448? The explanation to not use RSA is by linking to <https://blog.trailofbits.com/2019/07/08/fuck-rsa/>. I will only quote one thing from this article:

>RSA was an important milestone in the development of secure communications, but the last two decades of cryptographic research have rendered it obsolete.

You can't say it is obsolete when it is still in use. I'm not sure what the author(s) mean by "obsolete", but it is not true that RSA is obsolete. (If Ed25519 breaks but RSA doesn't, who will be obsolete?)

3) Sending files between computers

Here it recommends Magic Wormhole. That's shocking to me, I don't understand why it is recommended. Why not rsync? If you look at the 2016 presentation for Magic Wormhole <https://www.lothar.com/~warner/MagicWormhole-PyCon2016.pdf>, the pitch is that it is especially useful when the computers are unrelated. How often is that the case? Rsync is a much better solution for anyone who wants to transfer files between servers they have access to.

4) Encrypting Backups

Here they recommend tarsnap as "the usual recommendation", I've got to say, it's definitely not the usual recommendation.

5) Encrypting Application Data

They say to use Tink or libsodium. Tink has many implementations in each language, (how does that help security?) and libsodium doesn't support RSA, two things on top of my head that may be deal breakers.

6) Encrypting Files

They recommend age; wishful thinking as most people do not use age. In fact most people do not bother encrypting files, and it is not something that is done often. The author likes to talk about footguns, well there's certainly many footguns to file encryption. This is where the most analysis is on this blog article too, but this is a niche case.

7) Private Messaging

It recommends Signal. What about e-mail?

>(Unless you’re legally required to use PGP because of a government regulation… in which case, why do you care about my recommendations if you’re chained by the ankle to your government’s bad technology choices?)

It comes off as know-it-all.

Let me close with this: Cryptography is infamous for debates. It never ends, and many people have ended up with egg on their face for their claims. Tread carefully and don't rely on others too much!

  git cat-file commit HEAD

  tree <tree-hash>
  parent <parent-hash>
  author <author-name> <author-email> <timestamp>
  committer <committer-name> <committer-email> <timestamp>
  gpgsig -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
   
   <ascii-armored RFC9580 signature>
   -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

  <commit message>

You can add a patch to git to support more signature types than just OpenPGP. You may then be able to move mountains and get GitHub/others to join in the validation. Finally, if you can find bugs/exploits in GnuPG, you should report them and you will definitely get credit and recognition for them. They are not trivial to find.

They patched it when they became aware of it in <https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/issues/1011>, it was not "allowed" to go unpatched.

>How about the fact that GnuPG is predicated upon the web of trust

No it is not, the web of trust is one mode of operation out of infinitely many that you can come up with, it's not forced upon the user. It was evangelized for a long time until the keyservers got DOSed. In retrospect obvious, but also gnupg is more-or-less an "activist" project -- big corps and govs are against encryption for the masses by and large. Had it had institutional backing from the beginning (which it never got) it'd have a much more robust model for users to work with.

>encourages misuse in the form of long-lived identities which discourages key rotation

You can automate key rotation with gpg. The long-lived identity argument can be seen as a strength too, short-lived isn't always better.

>a littany of vulnerabilities involving authentication and downgrade attacks?

I'm not aware of these; do you mean that GnuPG is not secure by default in its algorithm list? It chooses compatibility over security, but you're free to change the configuration. I think it's too harsh to say that GnuPG is inadequate because of that.

>GNU is just organizationally incapable of producing secure code.

I don't see why that'd be true, anyone can contribute to GNU so there is nothing inherent about GNU that makes its projects insecure.

>GPG is not good. It is broken at a fundamental level.

Works for me! I use it to sign my git commits and tarball releases, and with gpg-agent I get to authenticate to SSH servers.