> There are probably 10x as many dumb potential attackers as smart ones, and it makes sense to be eliminate the easy avenues for the dumb ones while you concentrate other resources on the smart ones. It's also important not to ignore both the intelligence value of security checks as well as their potential forensic value in the event of a successful attack.
This is the point that is always missed when talking about "security theater".
Smart and practiced people can make anything look easy. An attack on an airplane is simply too challenging for the vast majority of people to execute. Is it impossible? No, but almost nothing is impossible.
Making an attack difficult on a plane also eliminates the majority of severally mentally unstable from carrying it out. You can kill 300+ people in one instant, it is impossible to stop the truly motivated and capable (ultra tail risk) attacker, but it is crucial to stop the rest of the tail from casually taking down an airliner.
This is the point that is always missed when talking about "security theater".
Smart and practiced people can make anything look easy. An attack on an airplane is simply too challenging for the vast majority of people to execute. Is it impossible? No, but almost nothing is impossible.
Making an attack difficult on a plane also eliminates the majority of severally mentally unstable from carrying it out. You can kill 300+ people in one instant, it is impossible to stop the truly motivated and capable (ultra tail risk) attacker, but it is crucial to stop the rest of the tail from casually taking down an airliner.