> The result of all this, is when a submodule clone is performed, it might read one location from path = ..., but write out a different path that doesn’t end with the ^M.
How does this achieve “remote code execution” as the article states? How serious is it from a security perspective?
> I'm not sharing a PoC yet, but it is an almost trivial modification of an exploit for CVE-2024-32002. There is also a test in the commit fixing it that should give large hints.
EDIT: from the CVE-2024-32002
> Repositories with submodules can be crafted in a way that exploits a bug in Git whereby it can be fooled into writing files not into the submodule's worktree but into a .git/ directory. This allows writing a hook that will be executed while the clone operation is still running, giving the user no opportunity to inspect the code that is being executed.
So a repository can contain a malicious git hook. Normally git hooks aren’t installed by ‘git clone’, but this exploit allows one to, and a git hook can run during the clone operation.
How does this achieve “remote code execution” as the article states? How serious is it from a security perspective?
> I'm not sharing a PoC yet, but it is an almost trivial modification of an exploit for CVE-2024-32002. There is also a test in the commit fixing it that should give large hints.
EDIT: from the CVE-2024-32002
> Repositories with submodules can be crafted in a way that exploits a bug in Git whereby it can be fooled into writing files not into the submodule's worktree but into a .git/ directory. This allows writing a hook that will be executed while the clone operation is still running, giving the user no opportunity to inspect the code that is being executed.
So a repository can contain a malicious git hook. Normally git hooks aren’t installed by ‘git clone’, but this exploit allows one to, and a git hook can run during the clone operation.