Beliefs derived from the output of LLMs that are ‘right most of the time’ pass one facially plausible precisification of ‘justification’ in that they are generated by a reliable belief-generation mechanism (see e.g. Goldman). To block this point one must engage with the post-Gettier literature at least to some extent. There is a clear difference between beliefs induced by reading the outputs of LLMs and those induced by the contents of a reference work, but it is inessential to the point and arguably muddies the water to present the distinction as difference in status as knowledge or non-knowledge.
Beliefs derived from the output of LLMs that are ‘right most of the time’ pass one facially plausible precisification of ‘justification’ in that they are generated by a reliable belief-generation mechanism (see e.g. Goldman). To block this point one must engage with the post-Gettier literature at least to some extent. There is a clear difference between beliefs induced by reading the outputs of LLMs and those induced by the contents of a reference work, but it is inessential to the point and arguably muddies the water to present the distinction as difference in status as knowledge or non-knowledge.