It does not appear to be "precisely" the procedure, in that sufficient nose up trim was not selected by the yoke manual trim switch prior to pulling the trim cutouts. And then they did not work the mechanical trim wheel hard enough to reset the residual nose down trim.
And, the crew left the power setting at climb throughout almost the entire sequence, so they oversped the airframe.
And, when they (against procedure) (apparently) turned the electric trim system back on, they did not use the yoke manual trim switch to fix the nose down trim problem -- which is a big mystery.
The MCAS design inhibits its FCC trim down output when manual trim is utilized. So, if they had just continuously pushed the nose up manual trim switch on the yoke until they got the trim to neutral, then pulled the cutout (either the first time or second time), the accident could have been avoided.
History shows this is not a good human factors design on the part of Boeing, but the crew does not look good, either, IMO.
And, the crew left the power setting at climb throughout almost the entire sequence, so they oversped the airframe.
And, when they (against procedure) (apparently) turned the electric trim system back on, they did not use the yoke manual trim switch to fix the nose down trim problem -- which is a big mystery.
The MCAS design inhibits its FCC trim down output when manual trim is utilized. So, if they had just continuously pushed the nose up manual trim switch on the yoke until they got the trim to neutral, then pulled the cutout (either the first time or second time), the accident could have been avoided.
History shows this is not a good human factors design on the part of Boeing, but the crew does not look good, either, IMO.