zhfliz

it's free advertising

yes

it might have changed recently but i have previously created accounts by providing trash mailer addresses during creation.

at least in Germany it's not legal to require use of personal devices such as phones for your job.

> No, as they never get loaded into the ssh binary and are external programs communicating over an interface.

my understanding is that the same would apply if you use ykcs11 in the OpenSSH agent instead of using it directly in `ssh`, which would make this a comparison between (OpenSSH agent + YKCS11) vs e.g., ssh-tpm-agent.

from the qualys report you linked:

> Note to the curious readers: for security reasons, and as explained in the "Background" section below, ssh-agent does not actually load such a shared library in its own address space (where private keys are stored), but in a separate, dedicated process, ssh-pkcs11-helper.

additionally, as I understand it, this basically boils down to use-after-free due to unsafe code, which could occur in either agent implementation, even without loading an extra .so, although the presence of .so loading in general certainly does increase the attack surface.

> `ssh-tpm-agent` is not dealing with secret material.

while the agent is certainly not accessing the private key directly, as long as you can access the agent and make it sign whatever you want, this will still be a very valuable vulnerability, with the only downside (compared to non-HSM keys) that you won't have persistent access to the private key, only temporary access for signing.

this can also be partially mitigated by requiring user interaction for every signing operation, but it's also not necessarily something that works for all use cases, such as when connecting to a few hundred destination hosts.

> There is a separation of concerns here though.

when you compare (OpenSSH agent + YKCS11) to ssh-tpm-agent, they're both separated from the main `ssh` process and communicate through the SSH agent API.

PKCS11 allows you to use `ssh -I /path/to/lib.so` directly, which there doesn't seem to be a comparable alternative for in ssh-tpm-agent, so I'll ignore that feature for now.

are you extending this to the usage of yubikey-agent and ssh-tpm-agent as well?

both variants, whether it's using a PKCS11 provider using a standardized interface, or using a completely custom SSH agent, will need to deal with secret material.

although I'm no expert on the inner workings of SSH, I'd expect there to not be much difference between having the OpenSSH agent interface with ykcs11 (which is also open source and can be reviewed) and using an alternative agent with piv capabilities that was found on github.

wow, didn't know about `ip --color`, that's awesome

people don't care about false positives on CGNAT either, so not much difference to the IPv4 situation if you target /64s

Quantum CA (brand, not operator)/HiCA still can't issue certs for domains they don't "control" by having RCE on the systems they point to.

all CA requirements for validation still need to be fulfilled for issued certificates, as ssl.com, the Quantum CA operator, which exclusively holds the private keys, is a "proper" CA.

this does not affect the trust in the CA infrastructure or ssl.com itself; while this is morally questionable to keep the business relationship, it does not mean the CA is not following the signing requirements.

you're free to decide who to do business with if you're not providing a core utility service.

would you like to no longer receive water or electricity at your home because your utility companies don't like you, despite (being willing to) paying the bills like any other citizen?