wolrah
Joined 12 years ago
Joined 12 years ago
> syncing data between computers you owned that all had publicly routable addresses is a much simpler problem.
In no way am I denying that people would like to solve the same problems easily. What I'm saying is that it would have been a much simpler problem requiring much less infrastructure. An application like SyncThing that works without any central infrastructure would have been an order of magnitude easier to implement in a world where every internet connected device had a unique routable address.
Dropbox gained popularity *BECAUSE IT MADE IT EASY TO DO THIS WHEN YOU'RE STUCK BEHIND NAT TRASH*. By the time it was even a thought in anyone's brain the internet had already been ruined by that garbage.
It would never have existed in a world without NAT because it wouldn't have been needed, syncing data between computers you owned that all had publicly routable addresses is a much simpler problem.
Every ISP that has CGNAT v4 without providing full v6 needs to be shut down. They are either incompetent or actively choosing to make their users' service less useful to restrict them and/or encourage "upgrades". Internet service has a public routable IP address, period.
The easiest way to avoid that problem is to just skip retail WiFi devices altogether because having WiFi basically always means assuming internet connectivity which is not far from mandatory cloud bullshit.
I have a pair of Govee ceiling lights that have a RGB+CCT primary downward facing light and an addressable RGB accent ring. The ARGB ring only exists in their app. As far as both their Matter support and their official API are concerned these units have a single element which is the downward light, the ARGB ring is not controllable from any third-party systems.
If these were using Zigbee, Z-Wave, or Matter over Thread they wouldn't be able to do this but because they use WiFi they can.
I'm going to be opening one up soonish to see how hard it'll be to just replace the controller with one running WLED (or even reprogram the controller already in it).
Other major reason being that "IoT" devices usually have the shittiest WiFi radios that usually don't even support 5 GHz and almost never support WiFi 6/7 modes where they aren't wasting a ton of airtime on their low-bandwidth communication.
A VM integration driver allows the host to just pass through to the guest the absolute position of the pointer over the virtualized display and the button/scroll events which allows it to not need to be captured and movement feels natural to the host system.
Newer guest OSes that support USB HID can generally support an absolute input mode which was intended for drawing tablets and it'll work well enough, but it's a bit of a hack and requires updating the USB descriptor any time the display resolution changes to keep them in sync so a VM integration driver is still nice to have.
Obviously in this case eMudhra has decided they don't want the responsibility anymore which I actually respect to some extent.
Yes, because of the project's open nature the Mozilla CA program Bugzilla and their dev-security-policy mailing list have become the de facto public discussion point for TLS-related issues.
edit: Yup just saw GP's reply and they clearly have opinions about HDR.
IMO this should always be pushed back against, because it's not a valid excuse. If the hardware is too constrained to support appropriate security then that hardware is not appropriate for the application (or no longer appropriate for the application, as the story often goes).
Also of course friends/family. The most technologically useless people I know can operate Plex and can access my collection with basically no support necessary.
So the security "provided by" common 1:many NAT comes from the fact that 1:many NAT inherently requires stateful connection tracking and by its nature traffic coming in from the "1" side without an associated connection or rule has nowhere to go, effectively denying any other traffic by default from the "1" side which is almost universally the untrusted side.
Do you know what else has stateful connection tracking and deny-by-default rules on untrusted interfaces? Every single firewall that's worth using or even was at one point worth using in a year starting with a "2".
So yes, in a world without NAT we'd still have stateful firewalls blocking unsolicited incoming traffic that had not been specifically allowed. Those who wish to host public services will still need to configure rules to allow that traffic in unsolicited but those rules will be simpler than NAT port forwards because there's no address translation involved. Anything else wanting to generate on demand temporary connections between systems will be able to do so simply by having each system perform a basic hole punch, sending traffic at the other at the same time with the same pair of ports, and expect it to work again in ways much simpler than what's necessary for reliably doing the same in a 1:many NAT environment.
1:many NAT makes nothing better, it only makes things worse. It's a bad thing and needs to go away as quickly as possible.
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1:1 NAT is an entirely different beast, it can be entirely stateless and thus has no has no negative impact on most protocols that don't try to communicate address info in-band but also that statelessness means it doesn't inherently provide a firewall effect.