withoutboats3
Joined 3 years ago
Joined 3 years ago
> The first method is far more difficult. It demands the same skill, devotion, insight, and even inspiration as the discovery of the simple physical laws which underlie the complex phenomena of nature. It also requires a willingness to accept objectives which are limited by physical, logical, and technological constraints, and to accept a compromise when conflicting objectives cannot be met. No committee will ever do this until it is too late.
(All from his Turing Award lecture, "The Emperor's Old Clothes": https://www.labouseur.com/projects/codeReckon/papers/The-Emp...)
On the other hand, the results of this true fact are already seen in practice in real systems. Rust's iterator adapters, for example, allow high level "functional style" with closures to be compiled to code that is exactly the same as hand rolled C loops without unamortized bounds checks - despite guaranteeing the absence of out of bound accesses even in the face of programmer error - because the constraints of these interfaces and the design of the language enable tons of optimizations by LLVM. This has been true since Rust 1.0 more than a decade ago, it's not a promise of the future.
Not to talk my own book, but there is a well-known alternative to C++ that can actually guarantee the absence of data races.
> System security is intimately connected with the idea of knowing the name of a process. If we do not know the name of a process we cannot interact with it in any way, thus the system is secure. Once the names of processes become widely know the system becomes less secure. We call the process of revealing names to other processes in a controlled manner the name distribution problem— the key to security lies in the name distribution problem. When we reveal a Pid to another process we will say that we have published the name of the process. If a name is never published there are no security problems.
> Thus knowing the name of a process is the key element of security. Since names are unforgeable the system is secure only if we can limit the knowledge of the names of the processes to trusted processes.
https://erlang.org/download/armstrong_thesis_2003.pdf (page 24-25)
Based on my experience with Rust, a lot of what people want to do with its "constant generics" probably would be easier to do with a feature like comptime. Letting you do math on constant generics while maintaining parametricity is hard to implement, and when all you really want is "a trait for a hash function with an output size of N," probably giving up parametricity for that purpose and generating the trait from N as an earlier codegen step is fine for you, but Rust's macros are too flexible and annoying for doing it that way. But as soon as you replace parametric polymorphism with a naive code generation feature, you're in for a world of hurt.
I do remember the details: the result of Bernstein v. United States was that you have a First Amendment right to publish code because it is a speech act and so the USGOV cannot prevent you from publishing effective encryption algorithms. Will model weights be afforded the same protection? What about serving a model without publishing its weights? We shall see.