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> You've gone from "they flew a broken aircraft" to "alight, so they repaired it twice, but you cannot ever trust a malfunctioning aircraft again."

If you think I've changed my argument, you misunderstood my comments. I still think that they flew a broken aircraft.

I'll stand by my statement that 610 should never have taken off, and I'm somewhat surprised that it is contentious. I don't care if all the protocols were followed and the logs made (though obviously the pilots of 610 didn't understand what the previous pilots had done to respond to their incident) - in retrospect, we know that the aircraft was not airworthy going into flight 610, so something needs to change so that next time that is detected before takeoff. Whether that is better observation of the protocols or better protocols, I'm not sure.

Can something be obsolete if it is still extremely widely used?

IIRC, Linux and FreeBSD both use a buddy allocator for physical memory, and I'm pretty sure it is used (in addition to other allocators) in jemalloc as well.

The comment you are responding to addresses the claim that the 737 max is not passively stable. It is less safe than other aircraft, but not because it requires active control for stable flight in any manner comparable to a fighter jet.

I'll direct you to some portions of my other comments that you seem to have overlooked:

> airlines and pilots were not informed well enough about MCAS

> previous auto trim systems could also be "out muscled" just by pulling back on the yoke without actually switching on the manual override.

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> polluting this thread with lies

I'm pretty sure everything I've posted on this thread is either true or obviously an opinion. If some things are not true, please point them out specifically so that I can correct them.

Nowhere have I said that the lion air 610 accident only happened because of poor maintenance or pilots actions, but it is undeniably true that with different pilot actions and aircraft maintenance the accident would not have occurred.

But they neglected maintenance when serious issues with the plane were apparent. The pilots of the flights prior to 610 noted that the two AoA sensor readings differed by ~20 degrees, and nearly aborted their flight before overriding the auto trim.

Flight 610 should never have taken off.

The procedure that pilots are taught to override auto trim was unchanged, but I think that previous auto trim systems could also be "out muscled" just by pulling back on the yoke without actually switching on the manual override. It's that second part that people are pointing out (though I will in turn point out that the pilots on the flight prior to 610 faced similar issued and used the manual override to respond to them).

> deflecting to something unrelated

I don't think it is unrelated that the only accident thus far of a plane with a failure mode that is more difficult for pilots to respond to was on an airline with a notoriously bad safety record.

I fully recognize the fact that airlines and pilots were not informed well enough about MCAS, but I'm also not ignoring the other circumstances of lion air 610

Safety in depth - a single failure should not be a problem. 610 crashed as a result of MCAS, but also a number of other operational failures of Lion Air and the pilots.

> criminal charges

Boeing informed the FAA of the changes, and the FAA decided that the pilots and airlines did not need to be informed. Criminal charges for Boeing would be extremely surprising.

No, it doesn't. The 737 max has software to prevent stalls in situations outside of the profile of normal flight. As does e.g. the A320.

It's interesting that you reach that conclusion.

I'll fly 737 max.

I won't fly Lion Air or Ethiopian Airlines.

Southwest: fleet size 754, founded 1967, total of seven accidents with 3 deaths.

Ethiopian Airlines: fleet size 107, 64 accidents with 459 deaths since 1965.

The new system (MCAS) was not intended to take action in normal flight. It was intended the trim in certain scenarios (roughly high AoA + steep turn + high g + near stall), but on lion air 610 the AoA sensor was malfunctioning, which caused MCAS to activate when it shouldn't have.

There already is a switch to disable auto trim. The pilots on the flight prior to 610 used it, as trained. The pilots on 610 did not.