tveita
Joined 14 years ago
Joined 14 years ago
This is disgusting behaviour, RCE chain or not.
But the Go issue is market urgent, and assigns it a CVE, so clearly there's more to it than that.
Clearly supporting multiple functions starting with 'p' would be overengineering.
e: While the actual CoT in neuralese paper is Facebook's Coconut https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.06769 - not sure if any production models use that one.
Luckily it's still up https://youtube.com/watch?v=CFVUSDzHL8A
I was worried the videos would already be disappearing given Trump's attempts to shut it down https://www.chemicalprocessing.com/safety-security/risk-asse...
That's pretty much it - a small refinement to "Chain of Thought" prompting, where you tell the model explicitly in the prompt to "Think step by step" or similar, so it writes out more steps before giving a final answer, potentially catching some errors. The "thinking" models are tuned to do that without being prompted to, and to output the "thinking" markers around it, so they can be hidden from the user.
Pretty sure those devs were saying the same thing way before 2017 as well, which seems to be ~ the last time RAM was this expensive.
Now RAM in the cloud, now you're really paying the Java premium.
That's exactly how it was with Dual_EC_DRBG.
E.g. https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2007/11/did_nsa_put...
I don’t understand why the NSA was so insistent about including Dual_EC_DRBG in the standard. It makes no sense as a trap door: It’s public, and rather obvious. It makes no sense from an engineering perspective: It’s too slow for anyone to willingly use it. And it makes no sense from a backwards-compatibility perspective: Swapping one random-number generator for another is easy.
My recommendation, if you’re in need of a random-number generator, is not to use Dual_EC_DRBG under any circumstances.
So most cryptographers _recommended_ staying the hell away from Dual_EC_DRBG. But hey, harmless, no one serious about security would actually use it right?Except as we know now, after the standardization NSA was able to persuade/bribe vendors to implement it.
RSA is still a viable cryptography vendor, after accepting money to backdoor their product for paying customers. The standardization gave them a fig leaf of plausible deniability. Honest mistake, could happen to anyone, right? If they had needed to implement a "non-standard" backdoor, or if it had been officially struck from the standard, it would have been a lot harder to row away from.