thejefflarson
Joined 16 years ago
Joined 16 years ago
This article is confused from the get go.
Seems pretty clear that they could decrypt the traffic they were interested in, they also talk about 5 years of retention of all traffic that they can decrypt at anytime. Sound familiar?
Looks like they used a squid feature: https://wiki.squid-cache.org/Features/SslBump
https://github.com/thejefflarson/little-cpu
I’m four instructions away from implementing the compressed extensions, and probably next week I’ll tackle the control and status registers. It uses an open source tool chain and is formally verified using riscv-formal. My hope is to eventually be able to compile some rust and get an fpga to blink an led :)
https://github.com/thejefflarson/getpasswd
It accesses the OS keychain to get the right password. I don't use offlineimap -- I use mbsync instead which has a PassCmd option where you can pass in a shell command (e.g. getpasswd <imap-server> <imap-user>). And another tool to add passwords to the GNOME Keychain:
https://github.com/thejefflarson/setpasswd
Adding passwords to the OSX keychain is easy enough, but I found it fiddly in Gnome's GUI. YMMV.
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/facilitating-an-enhanced-...
As to the point about selectors, if a selector has an even remotely domestic terrorism related component, and is authorized by the FISA court, the FBI can and does see that information.
Edit: added qualifier about terrorism
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/25/us/25stellarwi...
A key part of the FBI's mission is "to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats" after all: