simfinii
Joined 5 years ago
Joined 5 years ago
We have seen this explicitly become a problem for agent deployments like the ones you described. A lot of our initial users have built multi user, multi channel agents and need to keep track of end user identity through out that interaction. If you are interested in using alter for your concierge agents let us know! Would love to help out and onboard you ourselves.
We integrate with IDPs and allow agents to send little sign up links within chat interfaces so your agent can know exactly who its chatting with and enforce end user permissions and memory segregation
We will be open sourcing our codebase soon so you can examine the code yoursef!
Regarding SOC2, in the process of getting SOC2, Type 2 compliant. As you may know there is 3 month waiting period before the auditors give a SOC2 certification so currently in the waiting period for that
We are currently in the process being fully SOC2 compliant and have gotten pen tested twice from two different companies and have found no issues. You can explore the full extent of our security process and pen test results here : trust.alterauth.com
Separately would say it is a bad assumption to make that a product is vibe coded without trying it out. As mentioned in the post we adopted a lot of security processes as a part of our SDLC including consistent scans for supply chain attacks, and static code scanners (SAST).
We also do a pen test at a yearly cadence
The real value of alter comes in when you want to give your agents access to end users credentials. When agents act on behalf of end user as a developer you have to manage multiple credentials and more importantly manage the mapping relationship between end user identity and the credentials.
Also, as agents take actions the problem of non deterministic actions become more pronounced. With alters policy guardrails any chance of actions taking negative actions is mitigated.
Lastly, the full compliance trails of what the agent has done ends up being quite valuble especially as agents take more autonomus actions!
We have also gotten pen tested 2 separate times and have found no issues. You can find the result of one of the pen tests on the trust center
The right way to treat the agent is not as a delegated agent but rather as a stand alone agent with its own permissions and privleges.
In scenarios where an agent and humans are peers we recommend giving separate agent identities to the agent and treat them as separate privileged users and give them permissions based on their identity and not based on the identities of the users in the channel.
We support standlone agent identities that dont require end users as the principals. Can read about that here: https://docs.alterauth.com/guides/give-an-agent-scoped-acces...
Each agent can delegate a subset of its permissions. So if agent A started with the users permissions, it can delegate all of user A's permissions or a subset of user A's permissions.
In your case specifically the agent can delegate part of the permissions it has to the other agent to do part of the job. It can be as granular as you want it and its fully audited!