raesene9

Yeah for any even vaguely security related tasks, using Anthropic/OpenAI models is a minefield. You might be able to cheat them into bypassing guardrails but that risks getting more seriously blocked.

What's possibly even more annoying is that the guardrails in Claude Code aren't even consistent. I've had cases where just opening a new session and repeating the prompt works fine.

It's much easier to just move over to GLM/Kimi/Deepseek and not worry about it.

and if 20% of labor costs are translated (a.k.a 20% more unemployment), who's buying all the goods and services those companies create?

The tech companies will just parrot "UBI" at that point, but given how adverse they are to being taxed, how UBI would be financed, is an unanswered question.

Let's posit that that's possible, for Anthropic to get to 500B in revenue, they'd either need 100% of the market or the market has to be even bigger.

OpenAI, Google, the many Chinese labs all have products and several of them likely have better financial positions. At the moment Anthropic have one of the best models but it needs to stay sufficiently above competition for them to capture a large share of the market.

At the same time this year we've seen a move for model diversification as cheaper models become "good enough". If this IPO was 6 months ago I think it might have gone better for them.

If the company controls the enclave, and controls the software that contacts the enclave, how do you know that your messages only flow to the enclave and aren't also logged somewhere else?

Attestation can get you the idea that the software they're running is what they say they're running, but unless you constantly audit every version, how do you know that it operates exactly how they tell you?

I mean how do you know there's really an enclave there at all :D If your threat model is "this entire provider is untrusted and potentially hostile" it seems like there's lots of options for them to do bad things, that can't be fully solved by secure enclaves.

I definitely wouldn't trust standard Linux style containers that expose a shared Linux kernel at the moment, there's been far too many LPE and container breakout vulnerabilities this year. It's possible that in future if the kernel gets a lot more hardened, that could change but things like Firecracker are a better bet from a security standpoint.

But if all those peolple are unemployed will they still be able to buy all the products the corporations sell…..

One other option, if you're an obsidian user is, just add the excalidraw plugin there, and then you can ask your agent to just create excalidraw diagrams as needed.

Definitely Opus 5.5 via claude code has no problems generating Excalidraw images with no additional software, just based on conversation.

For some cybersecurity tasks, the Chinese models are already good enough, things like PoC development or things like exploiting mis-configurations.

Whilst I'm sure the top-end OpenAI/Anthropic models might be better, I've found their guardrails so twitchy (especially Anthropic) that I wouldn't try to use them for even vaguely security related work.

The key word in the post you're replying to is "normal". Non-technical people don't (in my experience) plan for this kind of thing, like at all.

The idea of multiple hardware keys, which have to be enrolled individually to every site, is just not an ordinary end-user friendly activity.

So passkeys may be great for technical users (who are happy doing that) or corporate users (where centralized IT systems can be put in place) but not for standard non-corp users (which realistically, is most people)

Jokes can be tricky in talks, as they rely on shared cultural context. If you know your audience well and know what will land with them it's great, if you don't then care is needed.

I generally advise people to put some jokes in if they like but don't make the talk rely on people getting the jokes.

This seems like a very nice release. Just ran it over my Kubernetes security benchmark that I run for most new releases. It was fast, cheap, and got a high scoring result, nice!

It's great that they're making the auto usage tokens free by default and I guess auto mode will be a good default for a lot of workloads, but recent changes to the auto mode classifier just moved me to either use YOLO mode or use a different harness.

I've been using Opus 4.6 for some security related work (it has much looser guardails that later opus models) and last week, all of a sudden, the processes started to fail. It wasn't the main model blocking commands but the auto mode classifier changed how it worked and it started blocking the main models commands.

That's one specific incident, but it does have a wider potential problem which is, if you use Anthropic's harness you'll always be at the risk of sudden breakage from server-side changes that are opaque to the end user, which is a tricky one for building long lasting processes.

Same Story as it ever was. The first time I encountered what I thought was a phishing attack at the bank I worked at 25 years ago, it turned out to be a marketing campaign, with URLs that put our company name as a user before the domain name (back in the day when creds could go in the URL).