psb217

"if you haven't read them you also shouldn't cite them" -- this is wildly incorrect in an academic context. If I'm using ResNets, I should cite the original ResNet paper, even if I haven't read it. If I'm using Transformers, I should cite the original Transformer paper, even if I haven't read it. If my work is a direct extension of method B, and method B is a direct extension of method A, I should cite the source of A, even if I haven't read it.

You can't claim independence from past work simply because you didn't look directly at it. The job of an academic researcher is to know the landscape of relevant ideas, where they come from, where they're going, and to hopefully contribute a few new good ones.

Citation chains should extend back from your work, along a reasonable line conceptual inheritance, back to a reasonable point of origin. Schmidhuber has different definitions for both of these reasonables than the bulk of the ML research community, to a point that makes him difficult to satisfy.

It seems like they're doing RL to minimize the reconstruction error when going through the: activation -> encoder -> "verbal" description of activation -> decoder -> reconstructed activation loop. Depending on how aggressively they optimize the weights of the AV and AR, they could move well away from the initial base LLM and learn an arbitrary encoding scheme.

If the RL is brief and limited to a small subset of parameters, the AV will produce reasonable language since it inherits that from the base LLM, and it will produce descriptions aligned with the input to the base LLM that produced the autoencoded activations, since the AR is still close to the base LLM (and could reconstruct the activations perfectly if fed the full context which produced them).

Yeah, I assume it was partly chosen since the problem structure provides some convenient hooks for selectively introducing subtle and less subtle inefficiencies in the baseline algorithm that match common optimization patterns.

The trick is that the vision tokens are continuous valued vectors, while the text tokens are elements from a small discrete set (which are converted into continuous valued vectors by a lookup table). So, vision tokens can convey significantly more bits per token than text tokens. This allows them to pack the content of multiple text tokens into a single vision token.

That past work will pay off even more when you start looking into diffusion and flow-based models for generating images, videos, and sometimes text.

I think there's an implicit assumption here that interaction with the world is critical for effective learning. In that case, you're bottlenecked by the speed of the world... when learning with a single agent. One neat thing about artificial computational agents, in contrast to natural biological agents, is that they can share the same brain and share lived experience, so the "speed of reality" bottleneck is much less of an issue.

But, if empirically our current system for net wealth creation tends to also produce wealth concentration, it makes sense to consider ways of modifying the system to mitigate some of the wealth concentration while maintaining as much of the wealth creation as possible.

Most of the people pursued in these "AI talent wars" are folks deeply involved in training or developing infrastructure for training LLMs at whatever level is currently state-of-the-art. Due to the resources required for projects that can provide this sort of experience, the pool of folks with this experience is limited to those with significant clout in orgs with money to burn on LLM projects. These people are expensive to hire, and can kind of run through a loop of jumping from company to company in an upward compensation spiral.

Ie, the skills aren't particularly complicated in principle, but the conditions needed to acquire them aren't widely available, so the pool of people with the skills is limited.

Comparing the process of research to tending a garden or raising children is fairly common. This is an iteration on that theme. One thing I find interesting about this analogy is that there's a strong sense of the model's autoregressiveness here in that the model commits early to the gardening analogy and then finds a way to make it work (more or less).

The sorts of useful analogies I was mostly talking about are those that appear in scientific research involving actionable technical details. Eg, diffusion models came about when folks with a background in statistical physics saw some connections between the math for variational autoencoders and the math for non-equilibrium thermodynamics. Guided by this connection, they decided to train models to generate data by learning to invert a diffusion process that gradually transforms complexly structured data into a much simpler distribution -- in this case, a basic multidimensional Gaussian.

I feel like these sorts of technical analogies are harder to stumble on than more common "linguistic" analogies. The latter can be useful tools for thinking, but tend to require some post-hoc interpretation and hand waving before they produce any actionable insight. The former are more direct bridges between domains that allow direct transfer of knowledge about one class of problems to another.

I think you misunderstood what I meant about setting a high bar. First, passing the bar is a necessary but not sufficient condition for superintelligence. Secondly, by "fair for" I meant it's fair to set a high bar, not that this particular bar is the one fair bar for measuring intelligence. It's obvious that usefulness of an analogy generator is a matter of degree. Eg, a uniform random string generator is guaranteed to produce all possible insightful analogies, but would not be considered useful or intelligent.

I think you're basically agreeing with me. Ie, current models are not superintelligent. Even though they can "think" super fast, they don't pass a minimum bar of producing novel and useful connections between domains without significant human intervention. And, our evaluation of their abilities is clouded by the way in which their intelligence differs from our own.

I don't think current models are capable of making abstract links across domains. They can latch onto superficial similarities, but I have yet to see an instance of a model making an unexpected and useful analogy. It's a high bar, but I think that's fair for declaring superintelligence.

In general, I agree that these models are in some sense extremely knowledgeable, which suggests they are ripe for producing productive analogies if only we can figure out what they're missing compared to human-style thinking. Part of what makes it difficult to evaluate the abilities of these models is that they are wildly superhuman in some ways and quite dumb in others.