perpetualpatzer

I think it's likely the same reason people lionize Robin Hood and loathe the Sheriff of Nottingham: people see Aaron as taking from the rich to give to the poor, and Sam doing things the other way around.

I suspect for some, there's also a sense of precedent-breaking. If one conceives of Aaron's crime as the taking of the data, or rejects that LLMs sufficiently transform ideas to sever the producer's claim on its publication, one might be left wondering: "is the society who believes Aaron deserved punishment the same that thinks OAI does not?"

> high grade + long ago remains a signal

Does it? I didn't think people looked at GPAs once you're 5 or so years into a career.

Nothing, it's just hard. The problem you trip over is retention of strong employees.

Many strong employees are ambitious and need the prospect of progression to be happy with their job. When growth slows below the employee ambition rate, not everyone can be sustainably paid more. Then you're faced with a choice of removing people to make space or employees being unhappy.

You can let this equillibrate naturally. The employees who are both ambitious and skilled enough to land other jobs will disproportionately be first out the door, leaving room for others. But this reduces the average talent level, and hurts company prospects, so many companies choose other paths. Some proactively fire the bottom 15% every year. Some heavily differentiate pay to make up for lack of promotions. Some constantly reorg and fail to find spots for employees in internal interviews. Offering a paid out for those who were thinking about it anyway seems a uniquely humane solution.

It would be interesting to see this argument stratified by some measure of college preparedness like test scores, or admission to a 4yr school.

If -- as the article seems to imply -- most of the effect is explained by what schools and programs poorer students are pathed into, it seems plausible that the failing is at the point of pathing (primary/secondary education).

So does English. Well, sorta.

Neither of those answers seem at all dishonest. They just skip past the diagnosed cause to focus on the impact.

Maybe the boss being a raging ass is the root cause of the team moving in the wrong direction. But that may be debatable, and knowing that doesn't answer the interviewer's question. The more relevant piece is that you and the director disagree and that you don't want to waste your time working on something you aren't inspired by.

Not OP, but also used the API for music discovery, crawling the related artists network from playlists I'd created to find highly connected nodes. I found that strategy was very efficient at filling blind spots in major genres I listened to, and reasonably good at exploring random niches, but generally wasn't the place I found songs that felt truly fresh to me. It felt like it got noticeably worse about 5 years ago, when I perceived them to have ramped up the payola, but that might just be in my head.

The major costs you're missing are marketing and "plate" (up front cost to produce the content). Those make up most of the total costs. For textbooks, the decision makers are professors (so door-to-door sales to get their attention), and the market is pretty small, especially for upper level content (so few units to amortize fixed costs over). Print, paper, and binding are cheap, say ~$10-12 average for a textbook. Typically, distribution channel takes a 20-25%, depending on channel partner, and many colleges mandate that sales go through the school bookstore because they get a cut, so publisher's website isn't necessarily a viable option (without a lot of student marketing). Author royalties run ~13-15% of revenue, and editors hit plate expense (they're publisher employees, so not a variable cost like authors). Textbook publisher Ebitda margins wind up running 20-25%, but most publisher's pay a lot of interest expense, partly because the major costs are up front, and partly because there's been a lot of PE ownership. Net margins can be tight as anyone else's.

Source: worked for a plaintiff publisher in this case. Think Pearson, Cengage, and MHE all publish financials also.

The chart you linked stops before it gets to the cohort discussed in the article. The youngest cohort shown is the 25-34 cohort in 2016 would have been born in 1982-1991 ("gen y"/"millenials"). The economist article is discussing the cohort born starting in 1997. It seems to think the chart gets rosier for the young.

When a company goes into bankruptcy, they still have assets (inventory, a brand, real estate, customer contracts) -- those things just belong to their creditors now. The new owners need _someone_ to manage selling all those things to recoup some money.

More often, though, the business is still worth more than the sum of its parts. It just wasn't making enough to pay the loans it'd taken out. Since the loans get eliminated in bankruptcy, the new owners might decide to just keep running the company (and want a new CEO, who they think will do a better job.

They can be, and that's a statement about the distribution and consistency of skill in those activities. I see little reason to believe those distributions apply to SAT taking or general capacity to learn (which is what you're really aspiring to measure).

If we set up an ELO league for best-of-three rock paper scissors, I'd expect score to diverge over sufficiently many hours, but would give almost even odds to a 99th v 93rd percentile candidate.